Bioeconomies of scope and the discard problem in multiple-species fisheries

Singh, Rajesh; Weninger, Quinn

doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2008.08.005

Cited by 40 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 20 publications

(20 reference statements)

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“…Therefore, my model does not yield the potential advantages of value-quotas. For a further discussion of value-quotas under imperfect selectivity see Singh and Weninger (2009). (2010), but I show that for more general cases no undifferentiated ITQ scheme is sufficient to prevent growth overfishing.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 90%

Growth Overfishing: The Race to Fish Extends to the Dimension of Size

Diekert

2012

Environ Resource Econ

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The gravity of growth overfishing is increasingly recognized. The size-distribution of fish stocks is often severely truncated, even when the overall biomass is reasonably well managed. In a first part of this article, I show how the "race to fish" extends to the dimension of size: Akin to the classical Bertrand competition in prices, each agent has an incentive to target fish at a smaller size. In fact, for perfect selectivity, competition between two agents is sufficient to dissipate all rents. In a second part of this article, I explore the implications of size-differentiated harvesting for ITQ regulation. I show that quotas specified in terms of numbers are far superior to those specified in terms of weight or value.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 90%

Growth Overfishing: The Race to Fish Extends to the Dimension of Size

Diekert

2012

Environ Resource Econ

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“…More recently, we find thatSquires and Kirkley (1991);Turner (1997) andSingh and Weninger (2009) develop models where the fishermen to some extent can adjust their catch composition in response to changes in exogenous variables, e.g., the fish price.…”

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confidence: 99%

Optimal Harvest in an Age Structured Model with Different Fishing Selectivity

Skonhoft

Vestergaard

Quaas

2011

Environ Resource Econ

102

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An age structured model of a fishery is studied where two fishing fleets, or fishing agents, are targeting two different mature age classes of the fish stock. The agents are using different fishing gear with different fishing selectivity. The model includes young and old mature fish that can be harvested, in addition to an age class of immature fish. The paper describes the optimal harvesting policy under different assumptions on the objectives of the social planner and on fishing selectivity. First, biomass yield is maximized under perfect fishing selectivity, second, equilibrium profit (rent) is maximized under perfect fishing selectivity, and third, equilibrium profit is maximized under imperfect fishing selectivity. The paper provides results that differ significantly from the standard lumped parameter (also surplus production, or biomass) model.

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“…Uncertainty in the aggregate stock levels is important for setting fishery-wide targets and quantitative evaluation of alternative regulatory regimes; however, here our focus is on bycatch avoidance behavior under quota-and non-quota based regulations. Aggregate uncertainty in quota managed fisheries is examined in Singh and Weninger (2012).…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cap-and-trade Bycatch Management with Costly Avoidance and Stock Uncertainty

Singh

Weninger

2015

Marine Resource Economics

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Regulations to reduce bycatch of non-marketed marine species often impose gear restrictions, reductions in harvest of the target species, and/or spatial and temporal closures of the fishing ground. These regulations can exact significant social costs in commercial fisheries. We evaluate performance of a cap-and-trade bycatch management policy. Harvest of a target fish species, costly avoidance of the bycatch species, and harvesting efficiency are examined in a stochastic production environment with and without at-sea observability of bycatch, and with and without trade in harvest quotas and bycatch caps. Our results suggest that precise implementation of a socially optimal management plan is possible only if bycatch is observable and trade in fish quotas and bycatch cap is frictionless. Conditions exist in which quota/permit trading raises bycatch relative to a no-trade environment. The results offer useful guidance for designing cap-and-trade bycatch management programs. KeywordsCap-and-trade bycatch management, costly bycatch avoidance, uncertainty BioOne (www.bioone.org) is a nonprofit, online aggregation of core research in the biological, ecological, and environmental sciences. BioOne provides a sustainable online platform for over 170 journals and books published by nonprofit societies, associations, museums, institutions, and presses.Your use of this PDF, the BioOne Web site, and all posted and associated content indicates your acceptance of BioOne's Terms of Use, available at www.bioone.org/page/terms_of_use.Usage of BioOne content is strictly limited to personal, educational, and non-commercial use. Commercial inquiries or rights and permissions requests should be directed to the individual publisher as copyright holder. Cap-and-trade Bycatch Management with Costly Avoidance and Stock UncertaintyRajesh Singh and Quinn Weninger, Iowa State University A B S T R A C TRegulations to reduce bycatch of non-marketed marine species often impose gear restrictions, reductions in harvest of the target species, and/or spatial and temporal closures of the fishing ground. These regulations can exact significant social costs in commercial fisheries. We evaluate performance of a cap-and-trade bycatch management policy. Harvest of a target fish species, costly avoidance of the bycatch species, and harvesting efficiency are examined in a stochastic production environment with and without at-sea observability of bycatch, and with and without trade in harvest quotas and bycatch caps. Our results suggest that precise implementation of a socially optimal management plan is possible only if bycatch is observable and trade in fish quotas and bycatch cap is frictionless. Conditions exist in which quota/permit trading raises bycatch relative to a no-trade environment. The results offer useful guidance for designing cap-andtrade bycatch management programs.

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Bioeconomies of scope and the discard problem in multiple-species fisheries

Cited by 40 publications

References 20 publications

Growth Overfishing: The Race to Fish Extends to the Dimension of Size

Growth Overfishing: The Race to Fish Extends to the Dimension of Size

Optimal Harvest in an Age Structured Model with Different Fishing Selectivity

Cap-and-trade Bycatch Management with Costly Avoidance and Stock Uncertainty

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