Buyback programs in commercial fisheries: effciency versus transfers

Abstract

A Cournot model of investment is used to characterize the pre-and post-buyback investment equilibrium for vessels operating in a total-allowable-catch-regulated fishery. Welfare effects -the net welfare gains or losses and the distributional effects -that may be expected from vessel buyback programs are identified. Net welfare effects depend on the ability of remaining vessels to replace buyback capital, the speed of capital replacement, and capital investment irreversibility. Net welfare effects are likely to be positive only under exceptional technological and capital-market conditions. A brief review of the British Columbia Pacific Salmon Revitalization Plan is presented to anchor the theoretical model. JEL Classification: Q28, D24Programmes de rachats de vaisseaux dans les pêches commerciales: efficacité versus transferts. Les auteurs utilisent un modèle d investissement à la Cournot pour analyser la situatioǹ d équilibre d'investissement avant et après le rachat de vaisseaux opérant dans des pêches où le total des prises permises est réglementé. Les effets de bien-être -les effets nets de gains ou de pertes et les effets de redistribution -qu on peut anticiper de programmes dè rachats de vaisseaux sont identifiés. Les effets nets de bien-être dépendent de la capacité des vaisseaux qui restent en service à remplacer le capital racheté, de la vitesse avec laquelle le capital est remplacé, et de l'irréversibilité de la capitalisation. Les effets nets de bien-être sont susceptibles d'être positifs seulement dans des conditions exceptionnelles sur le plan technologique et pour ce qui est du marché du capital. Les auteurs examinent le plan de revitalisation du saumon du Pacifique de la Colombie Britannique pour donner un point d ancrage au modèle théorique.

Management strategy evaluation for line fishing in the Great Barrier Reef: Balancing conservation and multi-sector fishery objectives

“…Commercial fishing effort in 2002-2003 was slightly over 1.5 times that in 1996, approximating what we modelled as an upper limit considered feasible just three years earlier. Effort creep (Wilen, 1979;Weninger and McConnell, 2000) may have meant that the effective effort was even greater than indicated by the raw number of reported fishing days. Commercial harvest over the same period rose by about 30% over that reported in 1998 and CPUE fell to under 80% of that in the mid 1990s.…”

Incentive-based approaches to sustainable fisheries

“…Often, the direct costs of buybacks are borne by the public purse and not by the fishers themselves. Buybacks are only a short-term solution to the underlying incentive problem; if they are successful in temporarily increasing the returns to harvesters who continue to fish, higher profits would encourage further investments and effort creep (Weninger and McConnell 2000) and, if anticipated by fishers, may even detract from conservation efforts (Clark et al 2005). As a result, the ability of buybacks to reduce long-term fishing effort and help stocks recover is limited (Holland et al 1999) without a corresponding change in fisher incentives (Fox et al 2003b).…”

Inserting Ecological Detail into Economic Analysis: Agricultural Nutrient Loading of an Estuary Fishery

“…First, where most of the fishery literature employs effort as the single human factor of production [59,60], capital and labor must be included in CGE so that the fishery interacts with other sectors. Second, the non fishery sectors hire capital and labor in service units per time period, in this case one year, but in the fishery factors may be employed considerably less than one year.…”