Across species, cued fear conditioning is a common experimental paradigm to investigate aversive Pavlovian learning. While fear‐conditioned stimuli (CS+) elicit overt behavior in many mammals, this is not the case in humans. Typically, autonomic nervous system activity is used to quantify fear memory in humans, measured by skin conductance responses (SCR). Here, we investigate whether heart period responses (HPR) evoked by the CS, often observed in humans and small mammals, are suitable to complement SCR as an index of fear memory in humans. We analyze four datasets involving delay and trace conditioning, in which heart beats are identified via electrocardiogram or pulse oximetry, to show that fear‐conditioned heart rate deceleration (bradycardia) is elicited and robustly distinguishes CS+ from CS−. We then develop a psychophysiological model (PsPM) of fear‐conditioned HPR. This PsPM is inverted to yield estimates of autonomic input into the heart. We show that the sensitivity to distinguish CS+ and CS− (predictive validity) is higher for model‐based estimates than peak‐scoring analysis, and compare this with SCR. Our work provides a novel tool to investigate fear memory in humans that allows direct comparison between species.

Humans have the adaptive capacity for imagining hypothetical episodes. Such episodic simulation is based on a neural network that includes the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). This network draws on existing knowledge (e.g., of familiar people and places) to construct imaginary events (e.g., meeting with the person at that place). Here, we test the hypothesis that a simulation changes attitudes towards its constituent elements. In two experiments, we demonstrate how imagining meeting liked versus disliked people (unconditioned stimuli, UCS) at initially neutral places (conditioned stimuli, CS) changes the value of these places. We further provide evidence that the vmPFC codes for representations of those elements (i.e., of individual people and places). Critically, attitude changes induced by the liked UCS are based on a transfer of positive affective value between the representations (i.e., from the UCS to the CS). Thereby, we reveal how mere imaginings shape attitudes towards elements (i.e., places) from our real-life environment.

Cardiac rhythm is generated locally in the sinoatrial node, but modulated by central neural input. This may provide a possibility to infer central processes from observed phasic heart period responses (HPR). Currently, operational methods are used for HPR analysis. These methods embody implicit assumptions on how central states influence heart period. Here, we build an explicit psychophysiological model (PsPM) for event‐related HPR. This phenomenological PsPM is based on three experiments involving white noise sounds, an auditory oddball task, and emotional picture viewing. The model is optimized with respect to predictive validity—the ability to separate experimental conditions from each other. To validate the PsPM, an independent sample of participants is presented with auditory stimuli of varying intensity and emotional pictures of negative and positive valence, at short intertrial intervals. Our model discriminates these experimental conditions from each other better than operational approaches. We conclude that our PsPM is more sensitive to distinguish experimental manipulations based on heart period data than operational methods, and furnishes a principled approach to analysis of HPR.

Need for Cognition describes relatively stable interindividual differences in cognitive motivation. Previous research has shown relations of Need for Cognition to Self-Control–a capacity that can be broadly defined as resistance to temptation–yet, the processes underlying this relation remain unclear. One explanation for the prediction of Self-Control by Need for Cognition can be an increased motivation to invest cognitive effort with higher levels of Need for Cognition. Another possible link could be that individual differences in the implementation of Self-Control intentions may play a moderating or mediating role for the predictive value of Need for Cognition. Such individual differences in the self-motivated initiation and maintenance of intentions are described by dispositional Action Orientation. Therefore, in the present study, Action Orientation was examined with regard to its possible role in explaining the relation of Need for Cognition to Self-Control. In a sample of 1209 young adults, Self-Control was assessed with two different self-report instruments and moderation and mediation models of the relationship between Need for Cognition, Action Orientation, and Self-Control were tested. While there was no evidence for a moderating role of Action Orientation in explaining the relation of Need for Cognition and Self-Control, Action Orientation was found to partly mediate this relation with a remaining direct effect of Need for Cognition on Self-Control. These results add to the conceptual understanding of Need for Cognition and demonstrate the relevance of trait variables to predict Self-Control.

Individuals tend to avoid cognitive demand, yet, individual differences appear to exist. Recent evidence from two studies suggests that individuals high in the personality traits Self-Control and Need for Cognition that are related to the broader construct Cognitive Effort Investment are less prone to avoid cognitive demand and show less effort discounting. These findings suggest that cost-benefit models of decision-making that integrate the costs due to effort should consider individual differences in the willingness to exert mental effort. However, to date, there are almost no replication attempts of the above findings. For the present conceptual replication, we concentrated on the avoidance of cognitive demand and used a longitudinal design and latent state-trait modeling. This approach enabled us to separate the trait-specific variance in our measures of Cognitive Effort Investment and Demand Avoidance that is due to stable, individual differences from the variance that is due to the measurement occasion, the methods used, and measurement error. Doing so allowed us to test the assumption that self-reported Cognitive Effort Investment is related to behavioral Demand Avoidance more directly by relating their trait-like features to each other. In a sample of N = 217 participants, we observed both self-reported Cognitive Effort Investment and behavioral Demand Avoidance to exhibit considerable portions of trait variance. However, these trait variances were not significantly related to each other. Thus, our results call into question previous findings of a relationship between self-reported effort investment and demand avoidance. We suggest that novel paradigms are needed to emulate real-world effortful situations and enable better mapping between self-reported measures and behavioral markers of the willingness to exert cognitive effort.

The episodic memory system allows us to experience the emotions of past, counterfactual, and prospective events. We outline how this phenomenological experience can convey motivational incentives for farsighted decisions. In this way, we challenge important arguments for Mahr & Csibra's (M&C's) conclusion that future-oriented mental time travel is unlikely to be a central function of episodic memory.

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Adaptive cognition is fostered by knowledge about the structure and value of our environment. Here, we hypothesize that these two kinds of information are inherently intertwined as affective schemas in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Schemas (e.g., of a social network) emerge by extracting commonalities across experiences and can be understood as graphs comprising nodes (e.g., people) and edges (e.g., their relationships). We sampled information about unique real-life environments (i.e., about personally familiar people and places) and probed their neural representations with fMRI. Using representational similarity analysis, we show that the mPFC encodes both, the nodes and the edges of the schema. Critically, the strength of the edges is not only determined by experience and centrality of a given node but also by its affective value. We thus account for the involvement of the mPFC in seemingly disparate functions and suggest that valuation emerges naturally from encoded memory representations.