Contests (or tournaments) are pervasive in organizations. They help performance evaluation by eliminating common shocks affecting agents' performance. However, tournaments are less effective when participants have heterogeneous ability because participants may conclude that the ability gap is too large to be overcome by their effort. Our theoretical analysis shows that a similar loss of motivation arises when tournaments take place over multiple periods because interim performance acts in a way that is similar to heterogeneous ability. Analyzing the sales contests organized by a commodities company, we document that winning participants decrease their effort as their lead extends, whereas the effort of trailing participants fades only when the gap to a winning position is very large. We also show that, on average, when contests are introduced they induce a higher level of effort among participants, although the incentives weaken as the number of participants increases. Finally, we demonstrate that although retailers respond to the multiple performance dimensions of the incentive program in part by shifting effort toward sales of more expensive products, they channel most of the increased effort toward reaching more customers.tournaments, relative performance compensation, dynamic incentives, multitasking
We use Spain's Equality Law to test for the existence of agency problems between party leaders and their constituents. The law mandates a 40 percent female quota on electoral lists in towns with populations above 5,000. Using pre-and postquota data by party and municipality, we implement a triple-difference design. We find that female quotas resulted in slightly better electoral results for the parties that were most affected by the quota. Our evidence shows that party leaders were not maximizing electoral results prior to the quota, suggesting the existence of agency problems that hinder female representation in political institutions.
I. IntroductionIn most of the world's democracies, men are largely overrepresented in powerful positions in the public arena. Several theories may explain why We thank the editor, two referees,
This paper presents the results from a field experiment that examines the effects of nonfinancial performance feedback on the behavior of professionals working for an insurance repair company. We vary the frequency (weekly and monthly) and the level of detail of the feedback that the 800 professionals receive. Contrary to what we would expect if these professionals conformed to the model of the Bayesian decision maker, more (and more frequent) information does not always help improve performance. In fact, we find that professionals achieve the best outcomes when they receive detailed but infrequent (monthly) feedback. The treatment groups with frequent feedback, regardless of how detailed it is, perform no better than the control group (with monthly and aggregate information). The results are consistent with the information in the latest feedback report being most salient and professionals in the weekly treatments overweighting their most recent performance, hampering their ability to learn.
When targets depend on past performance, incentives are adversely affected by the ratchet effect. We provide theory and evidence that incorporating past peer performance into targets can alleviate this adverse incentive effect. In particular, we present an analytical model that characterizes optimal target revisions as a function of past own and past peer performance. We then test the predictions of our model using data on 2008–2010 performance targets from 354 units of a governmental agency responsible for reintegration of the long‐term unemployed into the labor market. As a unique feature of our data, we have information on peer group quality, defined as the extent to which peer performance is informative about common shocks. Consistent with our model, we find that higher peer group quality (a) increases sensitivity of target revisions to past peer performance, (b) reduces sensitivity of target revisions to past own performance, and (c) reduces the ratchet effect as reflected in managerial incentives to withhold end‐of‐year effort.
This paper studies a model of career concerns where (besides agents having different ability levels) principals are heterogeneous. Two types of heterogeneity are considered: principals can differ in their productivities, and in the visibility of the agents working for them. Productivity differences result in convex wage profiles and generate assortative matching between principals and agents. Visibility differences, on the other hand, affect the mobility and career prospects of agents, and can generate nonassortative matching. We characterize the equilibrium in this market, derive implications for the behavior of agents, and examine the incentives to invest in increasing productivity and visibility.
We develop a legal contract enforcement theory of the decision to own or lease. The allocation of ownership rights will minimize enforcement costs when the legal system is inefficient. In particular, when legal enforcement of contracts is costly, there will be a shift from arrangements that rely on such enforcement (such as a rental agreement) toward other forms that do not (such as direct ownership). We then test this prediction and show that costly enforcement of rental contracts hampers the development of the rental housing market in a cross section of countries. We argue that this association is not the result of reverse causation from a developed rental market to more investor protective enforcement and is not driven by alternative institutional channels. The results provide supportive evidence for the importance of legal contract enforcement for market development and the optimal allocation of property rights. (c) 2010 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved..
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