Women and Power: Unpopular, Unwilling, or Held Back?

Casas‐Arce, Pablo; Sáiz, Albert

doi:10.1086/680686

Cited by 122 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…In Sweden, Besley et al (2013) find that party-based gender quotas have a positive effect on men's competence, mainly due to the replacement of mediocre male leaders with more competent men. Other studies have found a positive link between (both male and female) politicians' education levels and quota implementation (Baltrunaite et al 2014;Casas-Arce and Saiz 2011). Still others illustrate that women who are elected via quota laws are at least as efficient as legislators as their male peers, and even outpace men in some measures of competency (Catalano Weeks and Baldez 2014;Murray 2010).…”

Section: Acceleration Effects: Quotas Facilitating Women's Access To mentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender Quotas and Women's Political Leadership

O’Brien

Rickne

2014

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may AbstractThough more than 100 countries have adopted gender quotas, the impacts of these reforms on women's political leadership remain largely unknown. We exploit a quasi-experiment-a zipper quota imposed by the Swedish Social Democratic national party on municipal party groups-to examine quotas' effect on women's selection and survival as leaders within their parties. We find that those municipalities where the quota had a larger impact became more likely to appoint female leaders, but not more likely to support the reelection of women to the post. Extending this analysis, we show that the quota increased the number of qualified female candidates without increasing the diversity among women within the group. These results lend support to the notion that quotas may have an acceleration effect on women's representation in leadership posts and help dispel the myth that quotas trade short-term gains in women's descriptive representation for long-term exclusion from political power.Keywords: gender quotas; political leadership; party leaders; political careers; electoral reforms; women and politics; subnational politics JEL Codes: G34, G38, J48, J20 The widespread adoption of gender quotas is one of the most important political developments of the modern era. As these reforms have spread around the world, there is increasing interest in their broader impacts (Franceschet, Krook, and Piscopo 2012). Despite our growing understanding of quotas' broader impacts, their effect on women's appointment to higher political office remains unknown. In particular, no study has yet considered whether quotas help or hinder women's selection to, and survival in, leadership posts within political organizations. This is a surprising oversight, both because of the potential significance of women's position in the political hierarchy for their descriptive, substantive, and symbolic representation and the conflicting expectations generated by the literature. On the one hand, quotas may increase the supply of women eligible for leadership posts and give them more opportunities to join forces to support other women for top office. This means that quotas could have a positive "acceleration effect" on women's access to top political posts. On the other hand, both scholars and activists have linked increases in "quota women" to stigmatization and backlash effects, which means that quotas could produce a trade-off effect in which immediate gains...

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Section: Acceleration Effects: Quotas Facilitating Women's Access To mentioning

confidence: 99%

Gender Quotas and Women's Political Leadership

O’Brien

Rickne

2014

SSRN Journal

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“…To overcome the problems of endogeneity and selection bias associated with OLS, we look at close elections and make use of a regression discontinuity design, or RDD (Imbens and Lemieux 2008;Hahn et al 2001;Lee and Card 2008;Brollo and Nannicini 2012;Pettersson-Lidbom 2008;Leigh 2008;Ferreira and Gyourko 2007;Folke 2014;Curto-Grau et al 2012;Casas-Arce and Saiz 2014). A RDD takes advantage of the fact that the probability of being a single-party majority government changes discontinuously at a certain cut-off point of the assignment variable.…”

Section: Identification and Forcing Variablementioning

confidence: 99%

Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits: a regression discontinuity approach

Artés

Jurado

2018

Public Choice

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Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a close-elections regression discontinuity design, we find that single-party majorities run budgets with a 1.5% point larger primary surplus than that of coalitions. In addition, we show that lower deficits are driven mainly by single-party majority governments' capacity to raise more revenues. These findings are robust to several model specifications.

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“…For example, Esteve-Volart and Bagues (2012) suggest that a lack of political competition allows party organizations to recruit fewer women compared to what voters prefer. Then a gender quota might increase voter welfare if it is consistently implemented in all districts as indicated in Casas- Arce and Saiz (2015). Murray (2010) finds that women who entered parliament after France's quota law were as equally active and efficient as male lawmakers.…”

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confidence: 99%

Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden

Besley

Folke

Persson³

et al. 2017

American Economic Review

323

215

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Representative democracies are frequently said to need competent men and women to function effectively. However, this argument hinges on a range of premises, including how parties promote candidates and how voters value them. For example, party leaders may be reluctant to promote talent in their party if this threatens their own position. Such reluctance may create a vicious circle of mediocrity where low-quality leaders select low-quality followers in order to cement their position. Cozy arrangements between mediocre leaders and candidates can be shaken up in a variety of ways. One interesting possibility, that we study in this paper, is the introduction of quotas on the gender composition of candidates.More than 100 countries have introduced some form of gender quota in their electoral systems. The merits of these policies remain hotly debated in the academic

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Women and Power: Unpopular, Unwilling, or Held Back?

Cited by 122 publications

References 53 publications

Gender Quotas and Women's Political Leadership

Gender Quotas and Women's Political Leadership

Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits: a regression discontinuity approach

Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden

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