Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-…fth of greenhouse gas emissions and threatens the world's most diverse ecosystems. Much of this deforestation is driven by illegal logging. We use novel satellite data that tracks annual deforestation across eight years of Indonesian institutional change to examine how local o¢ cials'incentives a¤ect deforestation. Increases in the number of political jurisdictions lead to increased deforestation and lower timber prices, consistent with Cournot competition between jurisdictions. Illegal logging and local oil and gas rents are short run substitutes, but this e¤ect disappears over time with political turnover. The results illustrate how local o¢ cials'incentives a¤ect deforestation, and show how standard economic theories can explain illegal behavior.

An error in the unit conversion from pixels to hectares lead to all the areal quantities in the text being smaller than they should have been. Only the number of hectares were changed; none of the text nor tables were changed. The changes do not affect the overall results or conclusions. Abstract

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дает разрешение на неограниченное использование, копирование на любые носители при условии указания авторства, источника и ссылки на лицензию Creative Commons, а также изменений, если таковые имеют место.

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