This paper investigates whether the industrial relations climate in Indian states has affected the pattern of manufacturing growth in the period 1958-92. We show that states which ammended the Industrial Disputes Act in a pro-worker direction experienced lowered output, employment, investment and productivity in registered or formal manufacturing. In contrast, output in unregistered or informal manufacturing increased. Regulating in a pro-worker direction was also associated with increases in urban poverty. This suggests that attempts to redress the balance of power between capital and labor can end up hurting the poor.

Lack of access to finance is often cited as a key reason for why poor people remain poor. This paper uses data on the Indian rural branch expansion program to provide empirical evidence on this issue. Between 1977 and 1990, the Indian central bank mandated that a commercial bank can open a branch in a location with one or more bank branches only if it opens four locations with no bank branches. We show that, between 1977 and 1990, this rule caused banks to open relatively more rural branches in Indian states with lower initial financial development. The reverse was true outside this period. We exploit this fact to identify the impact of opening a rural bank on poverty and output. Our estimates suggest that the Indian rural branch expansion program significantly lowered rural poverty, and increased non-agricultural output.

We have received useful comments from Oriana Bandiera, Steve Coate, Torsten Persson and a number of seminar participants. We are grateful to STICERD for financial support. Grace Wong and Berta Esteve-Volart provided some excellent research assistance. AbstractThe determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy. Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy. The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from India. We show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater, controlling for shocks, where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest.JEL Classification: D72, H11, H41, I38, 012, P26.

We study the effects of the progressive elimination of the system of industrial regulations on entry and production, known as the "license raj," on registered manufacturing output, employment, entry and investment across Indian states with different labor market regulations. The effects are found to be unequal depending on the institutional environment in which industries are embedded. In particular, following delicensing, industries located in states with pro-employer labor market institutions grew more quickly than those in pro-worker environments.

In recent times there has been a renewed interest in relationships between redistribution, growth and welfare. Land reforms have been central to strategies to improve the asset base of the poor in developing countries thought their effectiveness has been hindered by political constraints on implementation. In this paper we use panel data on the sixteen main Indian states from 1958 to 1992 to consider whether the large volume of land reforms as have been legislated have had an appreciable impact on growth and poverty. The evidence presented suggests that land reforms do appear to be associated with poverty reduction.Keywords: land reform, political economy, poverty, growth, India JEL Classification: D60, H11 O11, Q15, R11 © by Timothy Besley and Robin Burgess. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Devwudfw Lq uhfhqw wlphv wkhuh kdv ehhq d uhqhzhg lqwhuhvw lq uhodwlrqvklsv eh0 wzhhq uhglvwulexwlrq/ jurzwk dqg zhoiduh1 Odqg uhirupv kdyh ehhq fhqwudo wr vwudwhjlhv wr lpsuryh wkh dvvhw edvh ri wkh srru lq ghyhorslqj frxqwulhv wkrxjk wkhlu hhfwlyhqhvv kdv ehhq klqghuhg e| srolwlfdo frqvwudlqwv rq lp0 sohphqwdwlrq1 Lq wklv sdshu zh xvh sdqho gdwd rq wkh vl{whhq pdlq Lqgldq vwdwhv iurp 4<8; wr 4<<5 wr frqvlghu zkhwkhu wkh odujh yroxph ri odqg uh0 irupv dv kdyh ehhq ohjlvodwhg kdyh kdg dq dssuhfldeoh lpsdfw rq jurzwk dqg sryhuw|1 Wkh hylghqfh suhvhqwhg vxjjhvwv wkdw odqg uhirupv gr dsshdu wr eh dvvrfldwhg zlwk sryhuw| uhgxfwlrq1 AE Wkh dxwkruv duh judwhixo wr Dkelmlw Edqhumhh/ Sudqde Edugkdq/ Folyh Ehoo/ Iudqfrlv Erxu0 jxljqrq/ Mhdq Guh}h/ Plfkdho Olswrq/ Urklql Sdqgh/ Pduwlq Udydoolrq dqg d qxpehu ri vhplqdu sduwlflsdqwv iru khosixo frpphqwv1 Wlpr Khqfnho dqg Fhflold Whvwd surylghg deoh uhvhdufk dvvlvwdqfh1 Zh dovr wkdqn VWLFHUG iru lqydoxdeoh qdqfldo vxssruw1 LqwurgxfwlrqIlqglqj hhfwlyh phdqv wr uholhyh sryhuw| lv d ghqlqj plvvlrq iru ghyhorsphqw hfrqrplfv1 Wr wklv hqg/ d zlgh udqjh ri srolf| dowhuqdwlyhv kdyh ehhq lpsoh0 phqwhg1 Krzhyhu/ wkh ehqhwv ri pdq| vxfk hruwv kdyh ehhq txhvwlrqhg1 Vrph dujxh wkdw srolwlfdo frqvwudlqwv rq lpsohphqwdwlrq ghq| wkh srru wkh ehqhwv ri uhglvwulexwlyh hruwv1 Rwkhuv vxjjhvw wkdw ehqhwv wr wkh srru duh xqghuplqhg e| glvlqfhqwlyhv wr jhqhudwh lqfrph1 Zruvh vwloo/ wkhvh glvlqfhqwlyhv fdq d"lfw wkh qrq0srru zkr wu| wr txdoli| iru dvvlvwdqfh1 Wklv lq wxuq ohdgv srolf| dqdo|vwv wr txhvwlrq wkh zlvgrp ri lpsohphqwlqj uhglvwulexwlyh srolflhv dw doo/ irfxvlqj lqvwhdg rq srolflhv wkdw surprwh hfrqrplf jurzwk1 Frpedwwlqj vxfk shvvlplvp uhtxluhv hpslulfdo hylghqfh wkdw vrph uhglvwulexwlyh srolflhv kdyh dfklhyhg wkhlu vwdwhg jrdov1Wklv sdshu vwxglhv odqg uhirup dv d uhglvwulexwlyh srolf|1 Wkurxjkrxw wkh srvw0frorqldo shulrg/ lpsuryhphqw lq wkh dvvhw edvh ri wkh srru kdv ehhq ylhzhg dv d fhqwudo vwudwhj| wr uholhyh hqghplf sryhuw| +Fkhqhu| hw do1/ 4<:3,1 Lq d srru djuduldq hfrqrp|/ w|slfdo ri wkrvh lq pdq| ohvv ghyhorshg frxqwulhv/ wklv lpsolh...

We have received useful comments from Oriana Bandiera, Steve Coate, Torsten Persson and a number of seminar participants. We are grateful to STICERD for financial support. Grace Wong and Berta Esteve-Volart provided some excellent research assistance. AbstractThe determinants of government responsiveness to its citizens is a key issue in political economy. Here we develop a model based on the solution of political agency problems. Having a more informed an politically active electorate strengthens incentives for governments to be responsive. This suggests that there is a role both for democratic institutions and the mass media in ensuring that the preferences of citizens are reflected in policy. The ideas behind the model are tested on panel data from India. We show that public food distribution and calamity relief expenditure are greater, controlling for shocks, where governments face greater electoral accountability and where newspaper circulation is highest.JEL Classification: D72, H11, H41, I38, 012, P26.

We study how women's choices over labor activities in village economies correlate with poverty and whether enabling the poorest women to take on the activities of their richer counterparts can set them on a sustainable trajectory out of poverty. To do this we conduct a large-scale randomized control trial, covering over 21,000 households in 1,309 villages surveyed four times over a seven-year period, to evaluate a nationwide program in Bangladesh that transfers livestock assets and skills to the poorest women. At baseline, the poorest women mostly engage in low return and seasonal casual wage labor while wealthier women solely engage in livestock rearing. The program enables poor women to start engaging in livestock rearing, increasing their aggregate labor supply and earnings. This leads to asset accumulation (livestock, land, and business assets) and poverty reduction, both sustained after four and seven years. These gains do not crowd out the livestock businesses of noneligible households while the wages these receive for casual jobs increase as the poor reduce their labor supply. Our results show that (i) the poor are able to take on the work activities of the nonpoor but face barriers to doing so, and, (ii) one-off interventions that remove these barriers lead to sustainable poverty reduction.

No abstract