No abstract

No abstract

How do war-prone regions stabilize? This article tests realist, liberal, and constructivist hypotheses against the paradigmatic case of regional peacemaking, Western Europe after World War II. It concludes that none of the three theories perfectly explains the process of FrancoGerman reconciliation after 75 years of bitter conflict. Instead, the transition to stability occurred in two stages. The first stage, the transition, was driven by realist factors, principally the existence of a common Soviet threat and active American hegemonic participation. In the second stage, however, stability and cooperation were entrenched by liberal mechanisms, notably the institution of democratic political regimes and cooperative international institutions. I thus inductively arrive at the novel theoretical position that realist mechanisms may initially be required to compel regional rivals to put aside their differences, at least temporarily, and cooperate on the grounds of realpolitik, but liberal mechanisms are ultimately useful to sustain and deepen regional peace.How do war-prone regions stabilize? What can cause a group of states steeped in mistrust and violent conflict to put aside their grievances and build a constructive, stable future? Under what conditions can former enemies transform their relations from security competition to security cooperation? Is trust a prerequisite for regional cooperation and, if so, what type of trust? These are questions of fundamental theoretical importance. Presently, they are also of great practical importance as the international community seeks to forge lasting peace and stability in Eastern Europe and the volatile Middle East.The international relations literature presents three sets of answers to these questions. Realists emphasize power relations and the structure of international politics as the source of all international outcomes. Therefore, they would expect security cooperation among former rivals when a third state rises in power and threatens both of their interests. Alternatively, a sufficiently powerful hegemonic state could foster cooperation by assuring the rivals that neither has any incentive to

No abstract