Two Stages of Transition from a Region of War to a Region of Peace: Realist Transition and Liberal Endurance

Abstract

How do war-prone regions stabilize? This article tests realist, liberal, and constructivist hypotheses against the paradigmatic case of regional peacemaking, Western Europe after World War II. It concludes that none of the three theories perfectly explains the process of FrancoGerman reconciliation after 75 years of bitter conflict. Instead, the transition to stability occurred in two stages. The first stage, the transition, was driven by realist factors, principally the existence of a common Soviet threat and active American hegemonic participation. In the second stage, however, stability and cooperation were entrenched by liberal mechanisms, notably the institution of democratic political regimes and cooperative international institutions. I thus inductively arrive at the novel theoretical position that realist mechanisms may initially be required to compel regional rivals to put aside their differences, at least temporarily, and cooperate on the grounds of realpolitik, but liberal mechanisms are ultimately useful to sustain and deepen regional peace.How do war-prone regions stabilize? What can cause a group of states steeped in mistrust and violent conflict to put aside their grievances and build a constructive, stable future? Under what conditions can former enemies transform their relations from security competition to security cooperation? Is trust a prerequisite for regional cooperation and, if so, what type of trust? These are questions of fundamental theoretical importance. Presently, they are also of great practical importance as the international community seeks to forge lasting peace and stability in Eastern Europe and the volatile Middle East.The international relations literature presents three sets of answers to these questions. Realists emphasize power relations and the structure of international politics as the source of all international outcomes. Therefore, they would expect security cooperation among former rivals when a third state rises in power and threatens both of their interests. Alternatively, a sufficiently powerful hegemonic state could foster cooperation by assuring the rivals that neither has any incentive to

Intergroup leadership

“…Groups often coalesce when facing a mutual threat, or what Sumner (1906) refers to as "antagonistic cooperation" (p. 18). For example, Waltz's (1979) conception of the balanceof-power theory explains that nations will align with former enemies when both are faced with a superior power (Ripsman, 2005). The formation of the League of Nations following World War I represents another type of political system emerging out of conflict: a coalition against aggressors (Nye, 2007).…”

Debating the Sources and Prospects of European Integration

“…5 For President Dwight Eisenhower, U.S. troops could be withdrawn within four to eight years, and even NATO would not be needed "for longer than ten to twenty years." 6 Washington underestimated, however, the prevalence of the relative gains conundrum for France. The process of the EDC increased the French perception that the United States was about to leave.…”

“…5 They do so by ªrst maintaining a stable general balance of power internationally; second, by managing their relations with other great powers and preventing crises; third, by creating regional spheres of interest; and ªnally, by controlling their inferiors within those spheres. 6 Balancing is then only one of the power political drivers of international affairs, as the EU demonstrates.…”

“…As I argue elsewhere, whereas European security cooperation initially was merely a statist bargain among West European states and the United States, with no societal buy-in, by the late 1980s regional democratization, the creation of European political and economic institutions, and, to a lesser extent, economic integration brought European societies on board, ultimately transforming regional relations. 6 Witness, for example, the dramatic transformation of French public opinion toward Germany. While security cooperation was initially being negotiated in the early 1950s, the majority of the French public (55 percent of decided respondents) believed that France should not have even "cordial" relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).…”

“…Sheetz and Haine could argue that the EDC was different from other integration agreements because it was the only one that involved military affairs, but they describe themselves as realists, and the realist position is that fears of relative gains are just as acute in the economic as they are in the military sphere, mainly because economic might is the basis of military might. 6 struction, reject German entry into NATO in 1950, build an atomic bomb in 1954, and reject a nuclear-armed Germany from day one. They may be right, but this is beside the point because none of these examples involve integration.…”