Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to develop and clarify a central concept of knowledge management, tacit knowledge.Design/methodology/approach -The paper investigates the philosophical roots of the concept of tacit knowledge and compares its core elements with current uses of the concept in contemporary knowledge management research. Different interpretations of the concept are identified, analyzed and clarified. A more explanatory and useful interpretation is developed and applied to current issues in knowledge management. A new KM implementation model is described based on a fuller understanding of the tacit/explicit distinction.Findings -The main conclusion of the paper is that the concept of tacit knowledge as it appears in the literature is vague and ambiguous. This vagueness creates confusion that, in turn, makes developing and implementing KM strategies more difficult. However, by understanding the philosophic roots of the concept of tacit knowledge it becomes possible to develop a clearer and more useful interpretation of the concept that can be used to guide KM implementations. Practical implications -A new KM implementation model is described based on the analytical findings of the paper. An implied model based on a confused understanding of the tacit/explicit distinction is identified and rejected.Originality/value -The paper clarifies and develops one of the most important concepts in KM. It provides a fuller description of its role in KM and disentangles it from related but distinct concepts. The paper reframes the tacit/explicit distinction and provides a set of guiding principles to be used by researchers and managers.
James Rachels' seminal paper ''Why Privacy Is Important' ' (1975) remains one of the most influential statements on the topic. It offers a general theory that explains why privacy is important in relation to mundane personal information and situations. According to the theory, privacy is important because it allows us to selectively disclose personal information and to engage in behaviors appropriate to and necessary for creating and maintaining diverse personal relationships. Without this control, it is implied, the diversity of relationships would diminish; relationships would ''flatten out'', we might say. The aspect of the paper that addresses information flows (what I refer to as his information privacy theory) has been of particular interest to computer information privacy theorists. Despite its continued importance to computer privacy theorists, however, the information privacy theory appears to be contradicted by recent developments in computing. In particular, since the publication of Rachels' paper we have seen an extensive amount of personal information collected. Further, recent developments in computing falling under the heading of social computing have brought about a new wave of personal information creation and collection. This paper will reassess and resituate Rachels' information privacy theory in light of these developments. I will argue that the increasing collection of personal data will not flatten relationships as the information privacy theory predicts because such data lack contextual factors important to Rachels' general theory. The paper will conclude by pointing to some areas where Rachels' general theory and where his information privacy theory will continue to be relevant.
This article raises the question of how the ontological status of virtual objects bears on their intrinsic value. If virtual objects are unreal or less real than physical objects, does it mean that they will have less intrinsic value? If they have intrinsic value, what are the explanations for this value, and how do they relate to the ontological status of the virtual objects? First, the article reviews recent work concerning the ontological status of virtual reality and virtual objects. Second, it argues that in some cases the ontological status of virtual objects does undermine the value placed in them, in that the objects can fail to have the properties that ground the value attributions made to them, while in other cases their ontological status is not important. Finally, the article relates the grounding of value attributions to philosophical theories of value, in particular, perfectionism and hedonism.Virtual reality promises to extend human experience along a number of value dimensions. There are new possibilities for scientific exploration through 3-D interactive modeling of submicroscopic objects, new training opportunities for a wide range of tasks that would normally require expensive machinery or equipment, and new avenues of enjoyment and desire fulfillment via simulated sexual encounters, mortal combat, and other adventures.There is a tradition in philosophy going back to (and most strongly present in) Plato for which virtual reality might be seen as problematic on a number of grounds, including epistemological and moral ones (see the Phaedo, Republic, and Philebus). In this tradition, the unreality of virtual objects calls into question the appropriateness of associating them with knowledge and value. For Plato, the objects of knowledge are those things that are most real. A test of a knowledge claim implies a test of the reality of its objects. Pleasure and enjoyment are understood in similar terms. Pleasure in and enjoyment of something is assessed in terms of the reality of the thing enjoyed. First-person ascriptions of pleasure and enjoyment do not enjoy privileged status as they do in modern and contemporary theories of sensation and emotion.
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