Virtual Reality, Ontology, and Value

Abstract

This article raises the question of how the ontological status of virtual objects bears on their intrinsic value. If virtual objects are unreal or less real than physical objects, does it mean that they will have less intrinsic value? If they have intrinsic value, what are the explanations for this value, and how do they relate to the ontological status of the virtual objects? First, the article reviews recent work concerning the ontological status of virtual reality and virtual objects. Second, it argues that in some cases the ontological status of virtual objects does undermine the value placed in them, in that the objects can fail to have the properties that ground the value attributions made to them, while in other cases their ontological status is not important. Finally, the article relates the grounding of value attributions to philosophical theories of value, in particular, perfectionism and hedonism.Virtual reality promises to extend human experience along a number of value dimensions. There are new possibilities for scientific exploration through 3-D interactive modeling of submicroscopic objects, new training opportunities for a wide range of tasks that would normally require expensive machinery or equipment, and new avenues of enjoyment and desire fulfillment via simulated sexual encounters, mortal combat, and other adventures.There is a tradition in philosophy going back to (and most strongly present in) Plato for which virtual reality might be seen as problematic on a number of grounds, including epistemological and moral ones (see the Phaedo, Republic, and Philebus). In this tradition, the unreality of virtual objects calls into question the appropriateness of associating them with knowledge and value. For Plato, the objects of knowledge are those things that are most real. A test of a knowledge claim implies a test of the reality of its objects. Pleasure and enjoyment are understood in similar terms. Pleasure in and enjoyment of something is assessed in terms of the reality of the thing enjoyed. First-person ascriptions of pleasure and enjoyment do not enjoy privileged status as they do in modern and contemporary theories of sensation and emotion.

Beni Başka Âlemlere Götür! Kullanıcı Temelli Metaverse Etkinlik Deneyimi

“…Felsefi olarak hazcılık; algı, heyecan, his ve duyguların, değerin bileşenleri olduğunu savunur. Sanal gerçeklik (VR) sistemleri duyumlar ve hisler ürettiği ve VR ortamları algısal varlıklardan oluştuğu için haz kavramıyla ilişkilidir (Mooradian, 2006). Daha dar ve odaklı bir yaklaşımla konuyu ele alan Pizzi vd.…”

The Values of the Virtual

“…As I see it, questions about the reality of virtual items are orthogonal to questions about the number of value-salient kinds they belong to. 15 The latter question is about whether all instances of virtual X, whether they are real or not, share one or more morally salient kinds in relation to X. Nevertheless the two debates interact in at least two ways.…”

Philosophy of Computing and Information Technology

“…Critics have argued that these shiny objects are mere surrogates that lack authenticity [Borgmann, 1999] and that presence in VR and cyberspace gives a disembodied and therefore false experience of reality and present one with impoverished experiences [Dreyfus, 2001]. More optimistically, Mooradian [2006] claims that virtual environments and entities are good at creating hedonistic value as well as certain types of perfectionist value, notably intellectual and aesthetic value, though not value located in excellent physical activities.…”