The importance of privacy revisited

Abstract

James Rachels' seminal paper ''Why Privacy Is Important' ' (1975) remains one of the most influential statements on the topic. It offers a general theory that explains why privacy is important in relation to mundane personal information and situations. According to the theory, privacy is important because it allows us to selectively disclose personal information and to engage in behaviors appropriate to and necessary for creating and maintaining diverse personal relationships. Without this control, it is implied, the diversity of relationships would diminish; relationships would ''flatten out'', we might say. The aspect of the paper that addresses information flows (what I refer to as his information privacy theory) has been of particular interest to computer information privacy theorists. Despite its continued importance to computer privacy theorists, however, the information privacy theory appears to be contradicted by recent developments in computing. In particular, since the publication of Rachels' paper we have seen an extensive amount of personal information collected. Further, recent developments in computing falling under the heading of social computing have brought about a new wave of personal information creation and collection. This paper will reassess and resituate Rachels' information privacy theory in light of these developments. I will argue that the increasing collection of personal data will not flatten relationships as the information privacy theory predicts because such data lack contextual factors important to Rachels' general theory. The paper will conclude by pointing to some areas where Rachels' general theory and where his information privacy theory will continue to be relevant.

Privacy literacy instruction practices in academic libraries: Past, present, and possibilities

“…Voluntary association and the freedom from relational coercion are established through privacy in social, civic, and commercial contexts (Karst, 1980;Mooradian, 2009;Rachels, 1975;Wasserstrom, 1984). The choice to relinquish individual privacy and to establish shared privacy underpins the "intimate associations" identified by Karst (1980: 629, 634).…”

“…Furthermore, the very possibility of surveillance exerts a chilling effect on the broad behavioral category of speech, which includes information seeking and idea formation as prerequisites to expression (Benn, 1984;Cohen, 1996Cohen, , 2000Richards, 2013;Schauer, 1978;Solove, 2008;Wasserstrom, 1984). Properties of web data implicate privacy at an unprecedented breadth and scale (boyd, 2008;Mooradian, 2009), but the disproportionate energy directed to securing personal data obscures privacy's broader purpose. It is no benefit to the subject for her personal data to be secure if the very conditions of data collection distort her thoughts, decisions, or relationships (Cohen, 1996;Ho, 2015;Solove, 2008;Wasserstrom, 1984).…”

Privacy policies for health social networking sites: Table 1

“…For example, websites like checkMD (http://www.checkMD.com) may disclose users’ personal information to its business partners and other third parties 13. The site may also allow its users to incorporate features created by third parties and let users log into third-party sites using their profile data,14 which implies that health data available within the protected site might be leaked to the web. Consequently, health data may be exposed to various data recipients without users’ knowledge.…”

Privacy and brain-computer interfaces

“…Therefore, in the current research, privacy only has meaning where being observed is possible, whether physically or in descriptive data. Therefore, consistently with Nissenbaum (1997Nissenbaum ( , 2004Nissenbaum ( , 2009Nissenbaum ( , 2011Nissenbaum ( , 2015 and others (Gavison 1980;Introna 1997;Johnson 1989;Mooradian 2009;Reiman 1976;Solove 2002Solove , 2006, this project acknowledges that social context gives rise to meaningful conceptions of privacy. That is, privacy is understood to be a social construct.…”

“…Thomson (1975) initiated the debate, suggesting that the right to privacy is derived from and subsumed by other rights, such as the right to ownership of property and any rights over the person (for example, the right not to be looked at). 13 Three critiques of this argument followed (Rachels 1975;Reiman 1976;Scanlon 1975) and influenced subsequent scholarly discourse (see for example Austin 2003;Mooradian 2009;Volkman 2003).…”