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This paper analyses the new role of market‐maker of last resort openly assumed by central banks since the 2008 financial crisis revealed the increasing impact of noninterest‐income activities on banks' balance sheets. A brief review of the distinction between conventional and unconventional monetary policies shows that the inflexion point from lender of last resort to market‐maker of last resort is given by the extension of central bank intervention to other markets than the bank reserves markets. Herein, it is explained how the market‐maker of last resort role is as counterproductive as its predecessor in putting the economy back on track. We show that the main problem of both conventional and unconventional monetary policies is that they distort price signals, particularly asset prices, in their attempt to reignite economic growth. Instead of correcting cyclical fluctuations, the policies of the market‐maker of last resort prevent the cyclical divergences between financial and goods sectors from readjusting.

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We analyze the transition of central banks from lenders to market makers of last resort. The adoption of unconventional monetary policies characterizes this transition. In their new role as market makers, central banks engage in the latter by extending and reinforcing interventions in other markets than the traditional bank reserves market. We then explain that the difference between the two roles is one of degree rather than kind. In both cases, the prevention of liquidity shortages is a primary concern. As conventional policies become inadequate, central banks resort to unconventional policies to escape a general liquidity shortage at the zero lower bound. However, these unconventional policies do not solve the structural problems in financial and real markets. Both conventional and unconventional monetary policies cause price distortions, in particular on asset markets. The policies of the market maker of last resort prevent necessary readjustments of cyclical divergences between real and financial markets.

La décision prise en janvier dernier par le gouverneur de la Banque centrale suisse d’abandonner le cours plancher établi avec l’euro depuis 2011 a pris tout le monde de court. Pourtant, la situation particulière du franc suisse sur le marché des changes en tant que monnaie refuge fragilisait dès le départ la capacité de la Banque centrale suisse, dans un contexte de fortes turbulences économiques, d’honorer un tel accord sans compromettre sa politique monétaire. L’objectif de l’article est de revenir sur les contraintes fortes qu’impose tout système de changes fixes afin d’en souligner les limites. À la lumière de cette analyse, il revient sur les incohérences sur lesquelles s’est construite la zone euro conduisant à la crise européenne des dettes souveraines.