Purpose: Islamic banks (IBs) must stay Shari'ah compliant to enhance their customer loyalty and obtain a competitive edge. Given the performance of Shari'ah supervisory board (SSB) continues to be a matter of concern especially for IBs across countries that have a different regulatory environment, the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of SSB characteristics on IBs' performance in Malaysia being a country that applies the most extreme intervention of regulatory agencies (pro-active model). Design/methodology/approach: A sample of 15 Malaysian IBs is used to test the study hypotheses for the period from 2008 to 2015 using the Generalized Method of Moments estimator.Findings: The results reveal strong support for a significant association between SSB size, doctoral qualification, change in the SSB composition and performance. In addition, the study supports the view that SSB with crossmembership and reputation is very important in improving the performance of IBs. Research limitations/implications: First, the paper focused only on Malaysia which adopts a pro-active model, and therefore, extending the investigation to include countries that adopt the different models may provide a better view of the best Shari'ah governance (SG) practices for IBs. Second, there is a need for more empirical analysis regarding the optimal SSB size of IBs. Practical implications: This paper provides empirical evidence for regulators and policy makers in Malaysia, to understand how to enhance the performance of IBs using SG. Furthermore, marketers of Malaysian IBs should focus on SG practices as an important element for attracting Muslim customers, especially as there is a lack in this aspect. Originality/value: To date, it seems there is no empirical study that has examined to what extent the impact of SSB characteristics on IBs performance can be affected by the degree of agencies intervention, whether extreme or slight. Malaysia has been chosen as the only country that adopts the most extreme model.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine the effect of dual board governance structure, i.e. Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) and board of directors (BoD), on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) in Southeast Asia region versus banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 45 IBs over seven countries covering the period of 2007-2015 based on the GMM estimator – First Difference (2-step). Findings The findings reveal that SSB and BoD for IBs in both regions are segmented in terms of ROA (negative interaction) and integrated in terms of Zakat ratio (Zakat on equity [ZOE]) (positive interaction) only for Southeast Asia region. Furthermore, SSBs positively affect multi-bank performance in Southeast Asia while its effect is absent for GCC. This suggests that Shari’ah governance practices for IBs in Southeast Asia are stronger compared to GCC IBs. Finally, BoD has a significant association with low ZOE for IBs in both the regions. Research limitations/implications The implications of this research is that the unique agency theory depicted in this study can be inferred when analyzing how dual board structure affects IBs' performance. Practical implications For regulators in both regions, SSBs must be given real power to monitor BoD. They should also balance the number of SSB scholars with experience in Shari’ah, as well as in law, accounting and finance. It is also important that such a balance of scholars with PhD in these areas be required for Southeast Asia IBs. For the GCC’s regulators, CG practices need to be improved by giving due importance to SSB characteristics and BoD structure. Originality/value Though the effects of dual board structure on IBs' performance has been previously examined in the literature, only SSB size has been used as a single proxy of SSB governance. Furthermore, no empirical evidence is recorded to date on this issue in Southeast Asia and the GCC regions. One of the innovations of this paper is the use of multi-bank performance measures in the IBs performance and corporate governance.

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PurposeThis paper aims to systematically review the existing studies on the relationship of Sharī'ah governance (SG), as represented by the Sharī'ah supervisory board (SSB), with firm performance of Islamic banks (IBs), to suggest opportunities for future research in this field.Design/methodology/approachBy adopting a systematic literature review, 21 empirical and theoretical papers published in Scopus concerning the relationship between SSB and performance of IBs were selected for review and analysis.FindingsIn light of the existing research studies' limitations, this paper suggests that the effect of SSB on IBs' performance still requires more empirical analyses using alternative analytical methods, alternative measures, and different periods (during crisis and non-crisis). Besides that, these studies should take into account the differences across jurisdictions in their SG models, the degree of agencies' intervention in SG practices, the control over cross-memberships of scholars, and the differences across IBs in the position of SSB in the organization structure.Practical implicationsThe analysis undertaken in this paper would address the literature gaps on the effect of SSB on IBs' performance as this study serves as a guide for the researchers, academicians, and interested researchers from Islamic international autonomous non-for-profit organizations, e.g. AAOIFI and IFSB in research related to this important area. Importantly, the findings of this study would support regulators and related authorities across jurisdictions with suggestions on improving the current SG practices.Originality/valueThis paper presents a critical review of the existing research on SSB and IB performance and suggests new variables, measurements, analytical methods, and new issues for researchers in this area. Thus, it identifies the literature gap that still needs further empirical investigation and a suitable way to close it.

Purpose This study aims to empirically examine whether there is any optimal Shari’ah supervisory board’s (SSB) size that maximizes performance of Islamic banks (IBs). Apparently, IBs adopt different SSB size based on their different regulations across jurisdictions, and then it is still questionable whether there is any optimal SSB size that can fit all and be recommended to IBs. Design/methodology/approach The paper investigates the impact of different SSB size on IBs performance using a sample of 113 banks over 23 countries for the period 2007-2015 based on the generalized method of moments estimator. Findings The empirical evidence documented in this study strongly highlights the importance of small SSB size in enhancing the performance of IBs as compared to the large board size. The findings confirm that the SSB size of IBs should neither be lesser than three nor greater than six. More specifically, it is found that the optimal SSB size seems to be five. Research limitations/implications First, the study does not investigate whether the findings are constant during crisis and non-crisis periods. Second, the optimal SSB size in IBs should be confirmed from the risk-taking perspective besides performance. Practical implications For both the IBs and the regulators, they should give due importance to small SSB size as an important element for improving the IBs performance. It is strongly recommended for the IBs to have a SSB size between three and six, and five is the most recommended. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions also should revise their existing standards that only suggest the minimum SSB size of three to include the maximum size of six and the optimal size of five. Originality/value Despite the SSB size plays an important role in affecting the performance of IBs, it seems there are no empirical studies attempting to address whether there is any optimal SSB size that can enhance the IBs performance so far.

Purpose There is much debate in the literature about how the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) should be measured. Basically, IBs’ business models are different from that of conventional banks; thus, the performance of IBs should be measured by using a Sharīʿah-based approach. This paper considers zakat (Islamic tax) as an alternative indicator to measure the performance of IBs. This paper aims to examine whether zakat ratios can be used as Islamic performance (ISPER) indicators for IBs besides the conventional performance (COPER) indicators. Design/methodology/approach The investigation covered a sample of 214 yearly observations of 37 IBs located in Indonesia, Malaysia, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for the period 2007–2015. This study used a single-factor congeneric model and confirmatory factor analysis, performed using the AMOS 23.0 software. Findings The findings assert that the discriminant validity of multi-bank performance, as measured by ISPER [zakat on assets (ZOA) and zakat on equity (ZOE)] and COPER indicators (return on assets, return on equity and operational efficiency in terms of assets), is very high. Hence, ISPER and COPER measurements are valid, either together to measure the multi-performance of IBs from both the Islamic and conventional perspectives, or independently as each measurement is valid to measure the Islamic and conventional performance if it is used separately. Research limitations/implications This paper does not investigate whether the findings are constant across time. This represents one of the limitations of this study. Practical implications It is strongly recommended that IBs calculate and disclose zakat ratios, particularly ZOA and ZOE, in their annual reports. Researchers and academicians should use these ratios for measuring the ISPER of IBs, either along with COPER or separately. Originality/value Empirical evidence is provided in this paper on the development and validity of zakat ratios as ISPER indicators in the Islamic banking industry. Zakat ratios are suitable indicators that can measure IBs’ performance and achieve the goals of IBs as well as those of Islamic economics. Technically, zakat has a dynamic ability to reflect the profitability of IBs. The more the IBs generate profit, the more they pay zakat. Furthermore, the greater the total assets of IBs, the higher the amount of zakat that they should pay. Thus, zakat ratios can be used as profitability measurements as in the case of tax ratios.