Purpose: Islamic banks (IBs) must stay Shari'ah compliant to enhance their customer loyalty and obtain a competitive edge. Given the performance of Shari'ah supervisory board (SSB) continues to be a matter of concern especially for IBs across countries that have a different regulatory environment, the purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of SSB characteristics on IBs' performance in Malaysia being a country that applies the most extreme intervention of regulatory agencies (pro-active model). Design/methodology/approach: A sample of 15 Malaysian IBs is used to test the study hypotheses for the period from 2008 to 2015 using the Generalized Method of Moments estimator.Findings: The results reveal strong support for a significant association between SSB size, doctoral qualification, change in the SSB composition and performance. In addition, the study supports the view that SSB with crossmembership and reputation is very important in improving the performance of IBs. Research limitations/implications: First, the paper focused only on Malaysia which adopts a pro-active model, and therefore, extending the investigation to include countries that adopt the different models may provide a better view of the best Shari'ah governance (SG) practices for IBs. Second, there is a need for more empirical analysis regarding the optimal SSB size of IBs. Practical implications: This paper provides empirical evidence for regulators and policy makers in Malaysia, to understand how to enhance the performance of IBs using SG. Furthermore, marketers of Malaysian IBs should focus on SG practices as an important element for attracting Muslim customers, especially as there is a lack in this aspect. Originality/value: To date, it seems there is no empirical study that has examined to what extent the impact of SSB characteristics on IBs performance can be affected by the degree of agencies intervention, whether extreme or slight. Malaysia has been chosen as the only country that adopts the most extreme model.

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Purpose This paper aims to examine the effect of dual board governance structure, i.e. Shari’ah supervisory board (SSB) and board of directors (BoD), on the performance of Islamic banks (IBs) in Southeast Asia region versus banks in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) region. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 45 IBs over seven countries covering the period of 2007-2015 based on the GMM estimator – First Difference (2-step). Findings The findings reveal that SSB and BoD for IBs in both regions are segmented in terms of ROA (negative interaction) and integrated in terms of Zakat ratio (Zakat on equity [ZOE]) (positive interaction) only for Southeast Asia region. Furthermore, SSBs positively affect multi-bank performance in Southeast Asia while its effect is absent for GCC. This suggests that Shari’ah governance practices for IBs in Southeast Asia are stronger compared to GCC IBs. Finally, BoD has a significant association with low ZOE for IBs in both the regions. Research limitations/implications The implications of this research is that the unique agency theory depicted in this study can be inferred when analyzing how dual board structure affects IBs' performance. Practical implications For regulators in both regions, SSBs must be given real power to monitor BoD. They should also balance the number of SSB scholars with experience in Shari’ah, as well as in law, accounting and finance. It is also important that such a balance of scholars with PhD in these areas be required for Southeast Asia IBs. For the GCC’s regulators, CG practices need to be improved by giving due importance to SSB characteristics and BoD structure. Originality/value Though the effects of dual board structure on IBs' performance has been previously examined in the literature, only SSB size has been used as a single proxy of SSB governance. Furthermore, no empirical evidence is recorded to date on this issue in Southeast Asia and the GCC regions. One of the innovations of this paper is the use of multi-bank performance measures in the IBs performance and corporate governance.

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