It is widely accepted that states have a right to control immigration, but must accept refugees at risk in their home countries. If this is true, perhaps states have a right to deport refugees once their lives are no longer at risk in their home countries. I raise three types of arguments against this claim, and in support of refugees' right to remain. Citizenship-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to obtain citizenship, and with citizenship comes the right to remain. Plans-based arguments hold that refugees have a right to plan their lives, and they will struggle to plan without the right to remain. Reciprocitybased arguments hold that refugees have a right to reciprocal relationships with citizens, far easier if they know they can remain. I reject the first two arguments, and defend the third.

States are increasingly paying refugees to repatriate, hoping to decrease the number of refugees residing within their borders. Drawing on in-depth interviews from East Africa, and data from Israeli Labour Statistics, I provide a description of such payment schemes, and consider whether they are morally permissible. In doing so, I address two types of cases. In the first type of case, governments pay refugees to repatriate to high-risk countries, never coercing them into returning. I argue that such payments are permissible if refugeesʹ choices are voluntary, and states allow refugees to return to the host country in the event of an emergency. I then describe cases where states detain refugees, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide their own payments to refugees wishing to repatriate. In such cases, NGOs are only permitted to provide payments if the funds are sufficient to ensure postreturn safety, and if providing payments does not reinforce the government's detention policy.

Over the past decade, millions of refugees have fled their countries of origin and asked for asylum abroad. Some of these refugees do not receive asylum, but are not deported. Instead they are detained, or denied basic rights of residency, some forced into enclosed camps. Hoping to escape such conditions, they wish to return to unsafe countries, and ask for help from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. In such cases, should NGOs and the UN assist refugees to return? Drawing on original data gathered in South Sudan, and existing data from around the world, I argue that they should assist with return if certain conditions are met. First, the UN and NGOs must try to put an end to coercive conditions before helping with return. Secondly, helping with return must not encourage the government to expand the use of coercive policies to encourage more to return. Finally, NGOs and the UN must ensure that refugees are fully informed of the risks of returning. Organizations must either conduct research in countries of origin or lobby the government to allow refugees to visit their countries of origin before making a final decision.

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Literature on the ethics of researching refugees, both as participants and partners, presents strong arguments for why anonymity is the safer option in the event of questionable consent. However, blanket anonymity, without asking refugee interviewees if they wish to be anonymous, may cause more harm than good in certain contexts. One such context which this article will explore is the context of Israel, where a working Refugee Status Determination (RSD) system has yet to be established. This case study highlights that, even in extreme circumstances where identity exposure can create risks, there may be a case for allowing identity exposure and perhaps an obligation on the part of the researcher to publish a name if this is the strong wish of the interviewee. This article builds on literature addressing confidentiality of identities (Duvell et al.

In April 1962, white segregationists paid money to African Americans agreeing to leave New Orleans. In 2010, the British National Party proposed paying non-white migrants money to leave the UK. Five years later, a landlord in New York paid African American tenants to vacate their apartments. This article considers when, if ever, it is morally permissible to pay minorities to leave. I argue that paying minorities to leave is demeaning towards recipients and so wrong. Although the payments are wrong, it is not clear if they are impermissible, given the benefits for the recipients. I argue that payments are impermissible if at least one of two conditions are met: The payments demean or harm other members of society, or the payments are provided to recipients who have failed to consent to the payments.

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