Paying Refugees to Leave

Abstract

States are increasingly paying refugees to repatriate, hoping to decrease the number of refugees residing within their borders. Drawing on in-depth interviews from East Africa, and data from Israeli Labour Statistics, I provide a description of such payment schemes, and consider whether they are morally permissible. In doing so, I address two types of cases. In the first type of case, governments pay refugees to repatriate to high-risk countries, never coercing them into returning. I argue that such payments are permissible if refugeesʹ choices are voluntary, and states allow refugees to return to the host country in the event of an emergency. I then describe cases where states detain refugees, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) provide their own payments to refugees wishing to repatriate. In such cases, NGOs are only permitted to provide payments if the funds are sufficient to ensure postreturn safety, and if providing payments does not reinforce the government's detention policy.

The economic effects of refugee return

“…Applying this benchmark, if the immigrant from a developing country is fully employed throughout their stay and their working time horizon is 25 years, the present value of the immigrant's foregone earnings if he or she returns is approximately $262,000 at a discount rate of 3%. This sum is at least 10 times larger than the highest known grant offered to encourage return and perhaps 100 times larger than the typical grant as reported in a recent report by Gerver (2017). Even this is an underestimate of the foregone earnings on return since the calculation assumes that the immigrant will not receive a pension on retirement in the host country and that he or she places no value on the future earnings of their offspring, which are higher if they stay.…”

Trading Liberty: Assisted Repatriation in Liberal Democracies

“…Such research tends to examine country-specific schemes, including those of Norway, Belgium and the UK (Lietaert 2017; Oeppen and Majidi 2015; Strand et al 2016). Some have questioned the voluntary nature of financially induced returns (Blitz et al 2005; Dünnwald 2013; Webber 2011), while others debate the ethical basis of such policies (Gerver 2017). Finally, effort has been made to examine the role of civil (Kalir 2017; Vandevoordt 2017) and intergovernmental (Ashutosh and Mountz 2011; Koch 2014; Webber 2011) actors in assisted repatriation.…”

Technologies of control: Asylum seeker and volunteer experiences in Australian immigration detention facilities

“…To locate this research within this tradition is to posit comparable intent or, at a minimum, functionality with respect to Australia's immigration detention system. A growing body of research documents government efforts to encourage 'voluntary repatriations' (a form of specific deterrence) (Gerver, 2017;Webber, 2011) through policies and practices that pressure asylum seekers to return 'home'. Such strategies often involve cynical attempts to make life in the host country untenable, while providing incentives to those who accept repatriation.…”

“…1 Deterrence involves efforts to discourage prospective asylum seekers from travelling to Australia ('general deterrence'), as well as attempts to make existing refugee applicants abandon their claims and return home ('specific deterrence') (Leerkes and Broeders, 2010). In recent years, scholars from around the world have drawn attention to government efforts to encourage asylum seekers to return 'voluntarily' to their country of origin, problematising the language of 'voluntary repatriations' by underlining the coercive nature of some such strategies (Gerver, 2017;Webber, 2011). Policies and practices that force asylum seekers into situations of isolation, destitution or despair are examples of this approach (Leerkes et al, 2016: 3;Webber, 2011: 104) and serve overarching deterrence objectives (Peterie, 2018).…”