Underlying all theories are philosophical presuppositions that lend themselves to different epistemological approaches, which need to be unfurled when comparing theories and offering alternative explanations. Contrary to Verheggen and Baerveldt's (2007) promulgation that 'enactivism' may be an adequate alternative for Wagner's social representation approach, this commentary outlines how this may be a misguided position.Enactivism, following an outward trajectory from nervous systems, to minds, to '(inter)action', to social enactivism, is incompatible with the dialogical epistemology underpinning social representations theory. Social representations are not reducible to individual minds, and dialogical interaction is not reducible to operationally closed 'systems' in (inter)action. The difference between the two approaches lies in the fundamental paradigmatic distinction between molar and molecular explanatory frameworks. Offering one as an alternative to the other overlooks the epistemological differences between the two and fails to appreciate the discrepancies between different levels of analysis, explanatory frameworks and the very phenomena that theories problematize. We Don't Share! The Social Representation Approach, Enactivism and the Fundamental Incompatibilities between the TwoAs Marková (1982) notes, underlying all theories (be they scientific or 'lay') are certain philosophical presuppositions, implicit or explicit, concerning the nature of 'man', the world and the interaction (or lack thereof) between the two. This is not to suggest there is a 'correct' and 'incorrect' way of studying psychological phenomena; rather, these presuppositions must be unfurled if one is to fully appreciate, and thus critique, the logic of any argument. Such philosophical assumptions Culture & Psychology

This paper revisits the emerging concept of interobjectivity and furthers Moghaddam’s (2003, 2006) proposal to prioritize this concept in Cultural Psychology. We argue that Heidegger’s phenomenology provides insights into a foundational understanding of what interobjectivity entails. We argue that human relations are not essentially characterized by intersubjective relations but rely on the non-conscious engagement in practices that occur within a social field that is phenomenally objective for subjects. From the phenomenological point of view, the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is a false one. Thus, we argue that the study of objects and object relations should be given greater attention in Cultural Psychology. To this end, we distinguish between two meanings of interobjectivity: (a) inter-objectivity as a description of object-relations; (b) interobjectivity as a description of a representation spanning different objectifications, and that permits diverse inter-objective relations. We claim that, taken together, these concepts provide a useful framework that can guide inquiry into cultural practices and intercultural relations.

Naïve realism research has demonstrated the fact that individuals deprecate alternative perspectives to preserve their own. With reference to an outgroup, this bias may be compounded by ethnocentrism. We present an operationalized measure of naïve realism in terms of attributions of knowledge and ignorance. We hypothesized that respondents would make higher attributions of knowledge to those who agree with them than those who disagree with them (naïve realism). We further hypothesized that respondents would attribute more knowledge to their ingroup than to an outgroup (ethnocentrism). Findings confirmed our hypotheses except for a black sheep effect marking higher attributions of knowledge to the outgroup with whom respondents disagreed relative to the ingroup. These findings demonstrate that social cognition is biased toward being more divisive and exclusive than open and inclusive. We suggest that overcoming the epistemic challenge may thus need to be the first step in conflict resolution attempts that successfully avoid the spiral of conflict.

Ignorance has been both vilified and celebrated throughout the ages. However, the social sciences have had little to say about this topic over the years. In this paper, we argue that in an age of competing and contrasting worldviews, scholarly attention to ignorance can shed light on interpersonal processes and relational dynamics that occur in encounters between subjects holding different points of view. We discuss data from two studies documenting an attribution of ignorance in social relations that serves to relegate the other's point of view to one that stands in need of education or correction. We argue that this communicative strategy enacts a semantic barrier that serves to retain the interlocutor's original point of view unscathed and unchallenged. We argue that this limits dialogical relations by eliminating the requirement for perspective‐taking in social dialogue.

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