Verheggen and Baerveldt's (2007) recent paper critiques the concept of 'sharedness' in Social Representations Theory (SRT). However, these arguments against sharedness are themselves founded upon an implicit argument against the role of 'representation' in SRT. This constitutes what I call the phenomenological critique of SRT. From a discussion of Heidegger's phenomenology one can better understand Verheggen and Baerveldt's argument. By concentrating on anchoring and objectification, the notion of 'representation' can be conceived as both a 'conscious' and a 'non-conscious' account of meaning. A Heideggerian phenomenological approach can unify the conscious and non-conscious elements of SRT into a common framework. Such phenomenological appreciation of SRT can contribute to a theory of meaning for cultural psychology.

This paper revisits the emerging concept of interobjectivity and furthers Moghaddam’s (2003, 2006) proposal to prioritize this concept in Cultural Psychology. We argue that Heidegger’s phenomenology provides insights into a foundational understanding of what interobjectivity entails. We argue that human relations are not essentially characterized by intersubjective relations but rely on the non-conscious engagement in practices that occur within a social field that is phenomenally objective for subjects. From the phenomenological point of view, the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity is a false one. Thus, we argue that the study of objects and object relations should be given greater attention in Cultural Psychology. To this end, we distinguish between two meanings of interobjectivity: (a) inter-objectivity as a description of object-relations; (b) interobjectivity as a description of a representation spanning different objectifications, and that permits diverse inter-objective relations. We claim that, taken together, these concepts provide a useful framework that can guide inquiry into cultural practices and intercultural relations.

The general aim of this paper is twofold. First, we evaluate Mead’s later efforts at developing a non-conscious theory of meaning that refutes the primacy of Descartes’s cogito as a foundational explanation of adult human understanding and social interaction. However, paired with this first goal, we also intend to use Mead’s theoretical framework as a paradigmatic example of a theory of intersubjectivity. We will show how Mead problematically reintroduces the presence of conscious awareness in order to provide an intersubjective account of mutual human understanding and interaction. We argue that this position reveals a lacuna in both Mead’s theory of meaning specifically, as well as in theories of intersubjectivity more broadly. Such approaches require a foundational account of practical meaning and knowledge. We conclude by exploring the links between these arguments and the emerging theory of interobjectivity.

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