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We present novel evidence on response times and personality traits in standard questions from the decision-making literature where responses are relatively slow (medians around half a minute or above). To this end, we measured response times in a number of incentivized, framed items (decisions from description) including the Cognitive Reflection Test, two additional questions following the same logic, and a number of classic questions used to study decision biases in probability judgments (base-rate neglect, the conjunction fallacy, and the ratio bias). All questions create a conflict between an intuitive process and more deliberative thinking. For each item, we then created a non-conflict version by either making the intuitive impulse correct (resulting in an alignment question), shutting it down (creating a neutral question), or making it dominant (creating a heuristic question). For CRT questions, the differences in response times are as predicted by dual-process theories, with alignment and heuristic variants leading to faster responses and neutral questions to slower responses than the original, conflict questions. For decision biases (where responses are slower), evidence is mixed. To explore the possible influence of personality factors on both choices and response times, we used standard personality scales including the Rational-Experiential Inventory and the Big Five, and used them as controls in regression analysis.

Why do some individuals cooperate with their fellow human beings while others take advantage of them? The human drive for cooperation and altruism is one of the most powerful forces shaping our society, but there is an enormous behavioral variance in individual behavior. At the same time, whether it is intuitive to behave in a cooperative manner or whether such behaviors are calculated deeds remains an unanswered question. Indeed, recent empirical investigations regarding the spontaneity of human cooperation have found mixed evidence, possibly due to a failure to induce compliance in the behavioral manipulations employed. We conducted a laboratory experiment inducing intuitive and deliberative behavior through gradual economic incentives that ensure compliance. To account for individual heterogeneity, we independently measured social value orientation and aversion to interpersonal (strategic) uncertainty. We find that these measures determine the intrinsic predisposition towards cooperation. Subjects with more altruistic social values or a higher tolerance towards interpersonal uncertainty are more cooperative. Crucially, we find causal evidence that there is no universal default mode of behavior. Rather, intuition enhances intrinsic predispositions, while deliberation moderates them towards socially acceptable behavior. That is, subjects with a higher (resp. lower) predisposition towards cooperation became more (resp. less) cooperative under time pressure compared with time delay. JEL Classification: D01 • D81 • C9

The preference reversal phenomenon is one of the most important, long-standing, and widespread anomalies contradicting economic models of decisions under risk. It describes the robust observation of frequent "standard reversals" where long-shot gambles are valued above moderate ones but then the latter are chosen, while the opposite "nonstandard reversals" happen rarely. This inconsistency casts severe doubts on commonly-used preference elicitation methods. Strikingly, alternative designs which should eliminate the phenomenon produce frequent nonstandard reversals instead, in a puzzling reversal of the phenomenon. We develop and test a model predicting when the phenomenon should occur, when its reversal should occur instead, and what determines the magnitude of the effects. The reversal of the phenomenon is predicted as a consequence of stochastic choice and risk aversion, without invoking any behavioral bias. The original phenomenon arises from stochastic choice and a systematic bias in monetary valuations, which is restricted to long-shot gambles. To validate the model, we conduct two experiments leading to the preference reversal phenomenon and its reversal, respectively. We employ a novel empirical approach allowing us to disentangle choice and valuation errors by relying on utilities estimated out of sample, and confirm that reversals are associated with errors in monetary valuations of long-shots, with the upward bias quantified at 293% in monetary terms. The data also confirms the model's novel predictions, showing that a larger bias strengthens the phenomenon and higher risk aversion strengthens its reversal. Surprisingly, our analysis implies that the magnitude of the original phenomenon has been underestimated so far.

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