ABSTRACT:The article presents and discusses estimates of social and economic indicators for Italy's regions in benchmark years roughly from Unification to the present day: life expectancy, education, GDP per capita at purchasing power parity, and the new Human Development Index (HDI). A broad interpretative hypothesis, based on the distinction between passive and active modernization, is proposed to account for the evolution of regional imbalances over the long-run. In the lack of active modernization, Southern Italy converged thanks to passive modernization, i.e., State intervention: however, this was more effective in life expectancy, less successful in education, expensive and as a whole ineffective in GDP. As a consequence, convergence in the HDI occurred from the late XIX century to the 1970s, but came to a sudden halt in the last decades of the XX century.Keywords: Italy, regional growth, human development, GDP, education, life expectancy JEL Classification: N30, N33, N34, N90, O15 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: we would like to thank Giovanni Federico, Leandro Prados de la Escosura and Giovanni Vecchi, for precious comments and for sharing unpublished data with us; we are also grateful to Alessandro Nuvolari and Pierangelo Toninelli for their advice. Emanuele

The origins of the Italian North-South divide have always been controversial. We fill this gap by estimating a new dataset of real wages (Allen 2001; Allen et al. 2011) from Unification (1861) to WWI. Italy was very poor throughout the period, with a modest improvement since the late nineteenth century. This improvement started in the Northwest industrializing regions, while real wages in other macro-areas remained stagnant. The gap Northwest/South widened until the end of the period. Focusing on the drivers of regional trends, we find that human capital formation exerted strong positive effect on the growth of real wages.

This article shows that a shift towards a more centralized school system can benefit countries that are characterized by poor levels of human capital and large regional disparities in education. In 1911, Italy moved from a fully decentralized primary school system towards centralization through the Daneo-Credaro Reform. The design of the Reform allows us to compare treated municipalities with those that retained school autonomy. Our quasi-experiment, based on propensity score matching (PSM), shows that centralization substantially increased the pace of human capital accumulation. Treated municipalities were characterized by a 0.43 percentage-point premium on the average annual growth of literacy between 1911 and 1921. We discuss some of the channels through which the new legislation affected primary schooling and literacy, with important implications for long-term economic growth.H uman capital formation is widely acknowledged as one of the main factors of economic growth, and this is supported by several well-established theoretical models. 1 Empirical evidence has confirmed that human skills and abilities are central to economic performance in the present day, as well as in the past. 2 As a result of this, one of the crucial themes investigated by the literature is the way that school systems are organized; that is, the extent to which schooling is managed and funded by local or central levels of government. Several pros and cons of * Authors' Affiliations: Gabriele Cappelli, University of Siena and University of Barcelona; Michelangelo Vasta, University of Siena. † We wish to thank one of the editors of this journal, Giovanni Federico, and three anonymous referees, for their constructive and very useful comments. The article also benefited from helpful feedback from

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. ABSTRACT: In this paper we examine the phenomenon of independent invention in Italy during the liberal age .We make use of a new dataset comprising all patents granted in Italy in five benchmark years: 1864-65, 1881, 1891, 1902 and 1911. We carry out the following exercises. First we examine the relative shares of independent, corporate and foreign inventions and their evolution over time and across industries. Second, by exploiting the peculiarities of Italian patent legislation which established a maximum patent length of fifteen years and a flexible renewal scheme which allowed inventors to maintain a patent "alive" for almost any specific duration, we assess the relative quality of independent and corporate patents. Our results indicate that in Italy independent inventors provided an important contribution to technological change but the quality of their patents was significantly lower than that of firms and of foreign patentees. Terms of use: Documents inJEL codes: N73, O31We would like to thank Sara Pecchioli for outstanding research assistance and Michele Mannucci for granting us access to their historical library of Ufficio Tecnico Ing. A. Mannucci s.r.l (Firenze). Giovanni Federico and Tom Nicholas have generously shared data with us. We are also grateful to

This article explores the structure of the italian capitalist system by focusing on the relationships between financial firms – banks, insurance and holding companies – and industrial companies in italy during the period 1952–72 through the analysis of the interlocks that existed between them. By an interlock is meant the link created between two firms when an individual belongs to the board of directors of both. The analysis is based on a database – imita.db – containing data on over 30,000 directors of italian joint-stock companies for the years 1952, 1960 and 1972. After a descriptive statistical overview of the companies and the directors included in the database, the article develops a network connectivity analysis of the system. This is integrated with a prosopographic study of the big linkers, defined as those directors cumulating the highest number of offices in each benchmark year. The article confirms that italian capitalism maintained substantial peculiarities in the period investigated. in particular, it argues that interlocks played an important role in guaranteeing the stability of the positions of control of the major private companies and their connections with state-owned enterprises. In 1952 and 1960 the system, centred on the larger electrical companies, showed the highest degree of cohesion. That centre dissolved after nationalisation of the electricity industry in 1962 and was replaced by a less strong and cohesive one, hinged on banks, insurance and the major finance companies.