The German Constitutional Court, we often hear, draws its considerable strength from the reaction to the German Nazi past:Because the Nazis abused rights and had been elected by the people, the argument runs, it was necessary to create a strong Court to guard these rights in the future. This contribution proceeds in two steps. First, it sets out to show that this "Nazi thesis" provides an inadequate explanation for the Court's authority and rise. The German framers did not envisage a strong, rights-protecting, counter-majoritarian court. Even where the Nazi thesis does find some application during the transitional 1950s and 1960s, its role is more complicated and limited than its proponents assume. In the second part, this paper offers an alternative way of making sense of the German Court's rise to power. Against a comparative background, I argue that the German Court's success is best understood as a combination between a (weak) version of transformative constitutionalism and a hierarchical legal culture with a strong emphasis on a scientific conception of law and expertise. The Court could tap into the resources of legitimacy available in this culture by formalizing its early transformative decisions, producing its own particular style, 'Value Formalism'. Value Formalism, however, comes with costs, most notably an interpretive monopoly of lawyers shutting out other voices from constitutional interpretation.

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In two recent, revolutionary decisions, - Janko Rottmann C-135/08 and Ruiz Zambrano C-34/09 - the European Court of Justice has firmly emancipated the status of citizenship of the Union from the “cross-border” requirement and has inaugurated a new area for the protection of rights closely linked to the core of sovereignty of States, - nationality and residence. This Article examines these two judgments and argues that they take the construction of citizenship towards a federal status. The “genuine enjoyment of the substance of citizenship rights” has emerged as a new legal category that is capable of providing a uniform and general protection and entails the affirmation of a core of rights of a supranational nature. This new development raises questions as to whether the ECJ's expansionist reading of citizenship constitutes a legitimate exercise of judicial power and as to what will be the relationship between citizenship and EU fundamental rights. We conclude by exploring the potential of the judgments analyzed in terms of placing Union citizenship at the center of the emergence of a constitutional patriotism in Europe.

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