This paper investigates how an organization attempts to repair trust after organizational-level integrity violations by examining the influence of organizational rules on trust repair. We reconstruct the prominent corruption case of Siemens AG, which has faced the greatest bribery scandal in the history of German business. Our findings suggest that tightening organizational rules is an appropriate signal of trustworthiness for external stakeholders to demonstrate that the organization seriously intends to prevent integrity violations in the future. However, such rule adjustments were the source of dissatisfaction among employees since the new rules were difficult to implement in practice. We argue that these different impacts of organizational rules result from their inherent paradoxical nature. To address this problem, we suggest managing an effective interplay between formal and informal rules.

Corporate Social Responsibility, subsidiarity, social market economy, globalization, co-responsibility, ISO 26000, Catholic encyclicals,

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Recent discussions on corporate citizenship (CC) highlight the new political role of corporations in society by arguing that corporations increasingly act as quasi-governmental actors and take on what hitherto had originally been governmental tasks. By examining political and sociological citizenship theories, the authors show that such a corporate engagement can be explained by a changing (self-)conception of corporate citizens from corporate bourgeois to corporate citoyen. As an intermediate actor in society, the corporate citoyen assumes co-responsibilities for social and civic affairs and actively collaborates with fellow citizens beyond governmental regulation. This change raises the question of how such corporate civic engagement can be aligned with public policy regulations and how corporate activities can be integrated into the democratic regime. To clarify the mode of CC contributions to society, the authors will apply the tenet of subsidiarity as a governing principle which allows for specifying corporations' tasks as intermediate actors in society. By referring to the renewed European Union strategy for Corporate Social Responsibility, the authors show how such a subsidiary corporate-governmental task-sharing can be organized.

corporate autonomy, supplier–buyer relationships, supplier development, outsourcing, Mattel, Inc., China, social and environmental standards,

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to identify three commonly observed mistakes made when managing suppliers and describe factors that contribute to successful buyer–supplier partnerships. Design/methodology/approach – Five extensive case studies in the automotive and clothing industry, as well as cases discussed in the literature, are analysed. Findings – Barriers to successful partnerships are a too strong emphasis on cost cutting and a too controlling management approach on the part of the buyer, and the abuse of insider knowledge for faking performances on the side of the supplier. Open communication, willingness to engage in mutual learning and encouraging innovations are observed in successful partnerships. Research limitations/implications – A limited number of case studies in the German automotive industry and the Turkish clothing industry are used. Both industries are subject to significant change which means that generalisations should be made with caution. Therefore, we discuss only problems and solutions that have also been identified in studies conducted in other industries and/or countries. Practical implications – Managers learn how to best manage partnerships with suppliers and what mistakes to avoid. Social implications – Partnerships aiming at improving working conditions are discussed. Findings and recommendations help managers improve their corporate social performance in the supply chain. Originality/value – Partnerships are approached from the perspective of the supplier to identify commonly made mistakes and successful practices of buyers.