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We analyze a sample of firms accused of fraudulently overstating their earnings and examine the extent, if any, to which they paid additional income taxes on the allegedly fraudulent earnings. Based on restatements of current tax expense adjusted for the tax benefits of stock options, the evidence indicates that many firms included the overstated financial accounting income on their tax returns, thus overpaying their taxes in the process of inflating their accounting earnings. We estimate that the median firm sacrificed eight cents in additional income taxes per dollar of inflated pretax earnings. In aggregate, we estimate that the firms in our sample paid $320 million in taxes on overstated earnings of about $3.36 billion. These results indicate how far managers of firms are willing to go when allegedly inflating earnings.

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Scholes et al. (2005) predict that S corporations, and other conduit entities such as partnerships and LLCs, can sell for a tax-driven purchase price premium relative to C corporations. We test this conjecture by comparing purchase price multiples in a sample of taxable stock acquisitions of S corporations to purchase price multiples for a matched set of taxable stock acquisitions of privately held C corporations. Consistent with Scholes et al.'s (2005) predictions, we find evidence that the organizational form of the target influences acquisition tax structure and acquisition price. Specifically, the evidence supports the conclusion that conduit entities (S corporations) fetch a taxbased purchase price premium relative to similar C corporations. Furthermore, our estimates indicate that average tax benefits in S corporation acquisitions are equal to approximately 12–17 percent of deal value.

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