This article offers an argument of genocide denial as an injustice perpetrated not only against direct victims and survivors of genocide, but also against future members of the victim group. In particular, I argue that in cases of persistent and systematic denial, i.e. denialism, it perpetrates an epistemic injustice against them: testimonial oppression. First, I offer an account of testimonial oppression and introduce Kristie Dotson's notion of testimonial smothering as one form of testimonial oppression, a mechanism of coerced silencing particularly pertinent to genocide denialism. Secondly, I turn to the epistemology of genocide denialism and, using the example of Turkey's denialism of the Armenian genocide, show how it presents what Linda Martín Alcoff calls a substantive practice of ignorance. Thirdly, I apply these considerations to individual practices of genocide denial and analyse the particular characteristics of testimony on genocide, the speaker vulnerabilities involved and the conditions under which hearers will reliably fail to meet the dependencies of a speaker testifying to genocide. Finally, I explore the harms that testimonial oppression perpetrates on members of the victim group, insofar as it systematically deprives them of epistemic recognition.

In this introduction to the special issue "Epistemic Injustice and CollectiveWrongdoing" we show how the eight contributions examine the collective dimensions of epistemic injustice. First, we contextualize the articles within theories of epistemic injustice. Second, we provide an overview of the eight articles by highlighting three central topics addressed by them: i) the effects of epistemic injustice and collective wrongdoing, ii) the underlying epistemic structures in collective wrongdoing, unjust relations and unjust societies, and iii) the remedies and strategies of resistance to epistemic injustice. We close by pointing to connections and issues that may motivate further research.Epistemic injustice is often discussed with respect to individuals. But it is not limited to individuals. Most often, individuals experience epistemic injustice because they are members of particular groups and these groups, in turn, also experience epistemic injustice. Indigenous peoples experiencing radical testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice in their interaction with courts, prison inmates having their emergency calls systematically silenced, Armenian testimony about the Armenian genocide being oppressed -these are but some instances in which groups experience collective epistemic injustice. The authors in this special issue on Epistemic Injustice and Collective Wrongdoing examine these collective dimensions of epistemic injustice. Their works evince that we cannot fully understand some of the collective wrongdoing that groups experience unless we employ the conceptual tools of theories of epistemic injustice and affiliated theories. Notably, theories of epistemic injustice are not limited to Miranda Fricker's (2007) powerful account of epistemic injustice and its two basic forms, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, but include further accounts and re-

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Genocide remembrance is a complex epistemological/ethical achievement, whereby survivors and descendants give meaning to the past in the quest for both personal-historical and socialhistorical truth. This paper offers an argument of epistemic injustice specifically as it occurs in relation to practices of (individual and collective) genocide remembrance. In particular, I argue that under conditions of genocide denialism, understood as collective genocide misremembrance and memory distortion, genocide survivors and descendants are confronted with hermeneutical oppression. Drawing on Sue Campbell's relational, reconstructive account of remembering, I argue that genocide denialism involves disrespectful challenges to memory, which systematically misrecognize rememberers. Adopting the case of Turkey's denialism of the Armenian genocide, I discuss two interrelated mechanisms through which this can happen: i) through the systematic portrayal of survivors and descendants as vicious rememberers, and ii) through distortions of the very concept of 'genocide'. Based on this, I show how hermeneutical and testimonial injustice are crucially interrelated when it comes to "contested" memories of historical injustice and the biographical testimony it gives rise to.

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