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In this introduction to the special issue "Epistemic Injustice and CollectiveWrongdoing" we show how the eight contributions examine the collective dimensions of epistemic injustice. First, we contextualize the articles within theories of epistemic injustice. Second, we provide an overview of the eight articles by highlighting three central topics addressed by them: i) the effects of epistemic injustice and collective wrongdoing, ii) the underlying epistemic structures in collective wrongdoing, unjust relations and unjust societies, and iii) the remedies and strategies of resistance to epistemic injustice. We close by pointing to connections and issues that may motivate further research.Epistemic injustice is often discussed with respect to individuals. But it is not limited to individuals. Most often, individuals experience epistemic injustice because they are members of particular groups and these groups, in turn, also experience epistemic injustice. Indigenous peoples experiencing radical testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice in their interaction with courts, prison inmates having their emergency calls systematically silenced, Armenian testimony about the Armenian genocide being oppressed -these are but some instances in which groups experience collective epistemic injustice. The authors in this special issue on Epistemic Injustice and Collective Wrongdoing examine these collective dimensions of epistemic injustice. Their works evince that we cannot fully understand some of the collective wrongdoing that groups experience unless we employ the conceptual tools of theories of epistemic injustice and affiliated theories. Notably, theories of epistemic injustice are not limited to Miranda Fricker's (2007) powerful account of epistemic injustice and its two basic forms, testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, but include further accounts and re-

Recent years have seen a shift in epistemological studies of intellectual self‐trust or epistemic self‐trust: intellectual self‐trust is not merely epistemologists’ tool for silencing epistemic skepticism or doubt, it is recognized as a disposition of individuals and collectives interesting in its own rights. In this exploratory article I focus on a particular type of intellectual self‐trust—collective intellectual self‐trust—and I examine which features make for valuable or pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust. From accounts of the value of individual intellectual self‐trust I take three frameworks for evaluating collective intellectual self‐trust: an epistemically consequentialist, a virtue‐theoretic and a prudential/pragmatic framework (§2). Then I introduce collective intellectual self‐trust (§3). Against this background I explain what is distinctive of valuable collective intellectual self‐trust (§4) and pernicious collective intellectual self‐trust (§5) within the three frameworks. I close by discussing the relation between the three frameworks and argue that evaluating intellectual self‐trust requires a multi‐perspectival approach constituted by the three frameworks.