Genocide Denial as Testimonial Oppression

Abstract

This article offers an argument of genocide denial as an injustice perpetrated not only against direct victims and survivors of genocide, but also against future members of the victim group. In particular, I argue that in cases of persistent and systematic denial, i.e. denialism, it perpetrates an epistemic injustice against them: testimonial oppression. First, I offer an account of testimonial oppression and introduce Kristie Dotson's notion of testimonial smothering as one form of testimonial oppression, a mechanism of coerced silencing particularly pertinent to genocide denialism. Secondly, I turn to the epistemology of genocide denialism and, using the example of Turkey's denialism of the Armenian genocide, show how it presents what Linda Martín Alcoff calls a substantive practice of ignorance. Thirdly, I apply these considerations to individual practices of genocide denial and analyse the particular characteristics of testimony on genocide, the speaker vulnerabilities involved and the conditions under which hearers will reliably fail to meet the dependencies of a speaker testifying to genocide. Finally, I explore the harms that testimonial oppression perpetrates on members of the victim group, insofar as it systematically deprives them of epistemic recognition.

Genozidleugnung: Organisiertes Vergessen oder Substanzielle Erkenntnispraxis?

“…Zudem haben solche faktischen und normativen Verzerrungen zur Folge, dass Überlebende und Nachfahren zum Schweigen gezwungen werden, da ihre Worte systematisch verdreht, missverstanden und diskreditiert werden. Wie ich an anderer Stelle gezeigt habe (Altanian 2021a), erschwert systematische Genozidleugnung dadurch die gesellschaftliche Verständigung über den Genozid und dessen Folgen und befördert testimoniale Unterdrückung. Abschließend lässt sich also festhalten, dass systematische Genozidleugnung Überlebende und Nachfahren in ihrer zentralen menschlichen Fähigkeit epistemischer Beteiligung (vgl.…”

Remembrance and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice

“…This is made easier by the vulnerable positions of particular memory narratives in the first place, as I have shown in the previous section. Conditions such as belief in partial or problematic definitions of genocide, victim-blaming, as well as testimonial incompetence of interpreters of memory claims (see, e.g., Altanian [2021] on the latter) all contribute to their hermeneutical marginalization. Such conditions seek to not only disenfranchise survivors and descendants from speaking for themselves and generating selfunderstanding in relation to experiences of genocide and its legacy.…”

Archives, Epistemic Injustice and Knowing the Past

“…This brings us to the second of the two recent developments in the literature on epistemic injustice that this essay engages with, namely the theorisation of denial of past wrongdoing as epistemic injustice. I take this development to primarily consist of three articles published in the second half of 2020, two papers by Altanian (2020) and Oranlı (2020) on the denial of the Armenian genocide and the paper by Song (2020) on Japan's denial of military sexual slavery. The cases discussed by Altanian (2020), Oranli (2020) and Song (2020) carry many similarities to the situation discussed in this section.…”

“…I take this development to primarily consist of three articles published in the second half of 2020, two papers by Altanian (2020) and Oranlı (2020) on the denial of the Armenian genocide and the paper by Song (2020) on Japan's denial of military sexual slavery. The cases discussed by Altanian (2020), Oranli (2020) and Song (2020) carry many similarities to the situation discussed in this section. Song (2020) offers an account of a backward-looking epistemic responsibility that elucidates the possibilities of making epistemic amends for past epistemic injustices and harms.…”

“…By examining the historical case of Kenya's 'migrated archives', I demonstrate that actions in the past can cause long-lasting epistemic harms and constitute complex and significant ethical challenges. The essay is situated in relation to two recent developments in the literature on epistemic injustice: the theorising of denial of past wrongdoing as a form of epistemic injustice (Altanian 2020;Oranlı 2020;Song 2020) and the interest in epistemic injustice and archives (Melanson 2020;Wouters 2020). The discussion primarily pertains to archives as a terrain for epistemic harms and injustice, and the issues that arise when archives are censored, hidden, or outright destroyed in efforts to sanitise collective memory.…”