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Purpose -The aim of this paper is to examine empirically the managerial earnings management practices of financially distressed firms, and to consider whether these practices changed during the recent global financial crisis. Although corporate distress has been a topic of research interest for many years, earnings manipulation by distressed firms has received relatively little attention. Design/methodology/approach -The paper uses three measures of distress, and discretionary accruals, a popular proxy for earnings management, to investigate the impact of distress on earnings management. Findings -The paper finds that managers of distressed firms engage more in income-decreasing earnings management practices compared to their healthy firm counterparts. The paper also finds some evidence of the effect of the global financial crisis on the association between financial distress and earnings management. Finally, the paper shows some evidence of positive market pricing of discretionary accruals in the non-crisis period, but a substantial reduction in pricing coefficients during the global financial crisis period. Practical implications -Financial distress experienced by firms provides incentives to managers for earnings manipulation. However, the direction of the earnings management could be income-increasing or income-decreasing. The findings from this study will allow investors to make better investment decisions for firms that are experiencing financial difficulties. Originality/value -This paper is the first in New Zealand to investigate the association between firm distress and managerial earnings management decisions. Recently, New Zealand experienced a spate of finance company collapses that somewhat contributes, indirectly, to financial distress experienced by firms. The New Zealand reporting environment is characterized by concentrated ownership, relaxed monitoring by regulatory authorities, and a very low litigation threat that provides an interesting setting to examine the research question. This paper is also the first to test the market pricing of earnings components in New Zealand.

This paper provides a meta‐analysis of the determinants of audit report lag, defined as the period between a company's fiscal year end and the audit report date. We group the meta‐analyzed studies into three categories: (a) audit and audit‐related determinants, (b) corporate governance‐related determinants, and (c) firm‐specific determinants. We find that audit opinion and audit season variables increase audit report lag, whereas Big 4 affiliation, nonaudit services, and auditor tenure decrease audit report lag. Among the corporate governance determinants, the existence of a financial expert member on an audit committee, and ownership concentration, reduce audit report lag. Finally, an examination of firm‐level characteristics reveals that firm complexity increases audit report lag, whereas profitability reduces it. We employ a meta‐regression technique and identify publication bias. Although we find some evidence of journal quality as a contributor to publication bias, the extent of publication bias from this source is small.

We synthesise the empirical literature on the determinants and consequences of financial distress, critique the findings and offer suggestions for future research. We categorise these indicators into (i) firm-level fundamental determinants, (ii) macroeconomic determinants and (iii) firm-level corporate governance determinants. We categorise the consequences into (i) financial reporting and auditing consequences, (ii) firm-level operational consequences, (iii) capital market consequences and (iv) corporate governance consequences. We suggest that future research can make a more meaningful contribution, by developing more comprehensive models of predicting financial distress which will entail a departure from the current partial analysis to a more holistic complex analysis.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the association between the corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the cost of equity (COE) and cost of debt (COD). Design/methodology/approach The authors use the multivariate regression analysis approach to address the developed hypotheses. Findings Using a sample of 230 Australian listed firms from 2004 to 2016, the authors document that firms complying with higher CSR affect both COE and COD negatively, which means that CSR disclosure reduces financing cost. Practical implication These results support the risk mitigation perspective of CSR compliance, showing that both the investors and creditors may lower their expected returns because they find that CSR can mitigate potential business risk. Originality/value The authors extend the CSR research with both COE and COD.

This paper examines whether the audit committee members of a board improve financial reporting quality if they are also on their organisation's compensation committee. Audit committees are responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process of organisations and have been urged to broaden their understanding of business risk and of the incentives provided by their firms' executive compensation structures. Acknowledging the interrelationships among executive compensation, risk-taking and financial reporting quality, members of audit and compensation committees have been advocating more information sharing between the two committees. Using archival data from a sample of Australian Stock Exchange listed companies, and discretionary accruals as a proxy for financial reporting quality, this study finds that firms with overlapping committees have better quality financial reporting than those without such an overlap. Our evidence for this is stronger in cases where managers tend to manage earnings upwards in order to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. We also find that the beneficial effect of the existence of overlapping committees is adversely affected by the equity holdings of directors with overlapping memberships.

Purpose This paper aims to examine whether audit committee ownership affects audit report lag. Independent audit committees are responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process, to ensure that financial statements are both credible and released to external stakeholders in a timely manner. To date, however, the extent to which audit committee ownership strengthens or compromises member independence, and hence, influences audit report lag, has remained unexplored. Design/methodology/approach This paper hypothesizes that audit committee ownership is associated with audit report lag. Further, the author hypothesize that both the financial reporting quality and the going concern opinions of a firm mediate the effect of audit committee ownership on audit report lag. Findings Using data from Australian listed companies, the author find that audit committee ownership increases audit report lag. The author further document that financial reporting quality and modified audit opinions rendered by external auditors mediate this positive relationship. The results are robust to endogeneity concerns emanating from firms’ deliberate decisions to grant shares to the audit committee members. Originality/value The study contributes to both the audit report timeliness and the corporate governance literatures, by documenting an adverse effect of audit committee ownership.

This paper investigates the relationship between audit fees and both fair value exposure and changes in fair value of investment properties. The study is motivated by the limited and inconclusive evidence on the effect on audit fees of full fair value reporting for illiquid assets. Using hand‐collected data from the Australian real estate industry, we find a negative (positive) association between audit fees and fair value exposure (changes in fair value of investment properties). Our findings also indicate that the use of unobservable inputs in fair value estimates for investment properties does not significantly increase audit risk and audit fees. Further, we find that audit fees are higher for firms with fair values of investment – properties estimated by external and mixed valuers – compared to firms with fair values estimated by directors alone. This study enriches the audit fee literature by documenting auditors’ pricing decisions in an area that involves significant estimation and valuation risks.