Preschoolers' theory-of-mind development follows a similar age trajectory across many cultures. To determine whether these similarities are related to similar underlying ontogenetic processes, we examined whether the relation between theory of mind and executive function commonly found among U.S. preschoolers is also present among Chinese preschoolers. Preschoolers from Beijing, China (N = 109), were administered theory-of-mind and executive-functioning tasks, and their performance was compared with that of a previously studied sample of U.S. preschoolers (N = 107). The Chinese preschoolers out-performed their U.S. counterparts on all measures of executive functioning, but were not similarly advanced in theory-of-mind reasoning. Nonetheless, individual differences in executive functioning predicted theory of mind for children in both cultures. Thus, the relation between executive functioning and theory of mind is robust across two disparate cultures. These findings shed light on why executive functioning is important for theoryof-mind development.Over the preschool years, children's understanding of their own and other individuals' mental states-that is, their theory of mind-goes though an important transition that is often indexed by their emerging understanding of false belief (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Recent findings show considerable cross-cultural synchrony in the age at which children gain facility with false-belief reasoning (Callaghan et al., 2005). It is not clear, however, whether this cross-cultural developmental synchrony can be attributed to universal developmental processes.Within Western cultures, several factors have been shown to affect the developmental timetable of false-belief and related theory-of-mind concepts. One factor believed to be particularly important is executive functioning (Carlson & Moses, 2001;Moses, 2001;Perner & Lang, 1999). Several studies of Western children have shown that their performance on false-belief and other theory-of-mind tasks can be predicted from tasks that tap executive-functioning skills such as response inhibition, cognitive conflict resolution, and working memory (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998;Davis & Pratt, 1995;Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995;Hughes, 1998;Perner & Lang, 2000). These relations typically persist even when factors such as age and verbal ability are controlled. To begin to assess whether this Copyright © 2006 NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript developmental pathway might be universal, we examined whether the relation between executive function and theory of mind also holds in children from Beijing, China.This population is of theoretical interest because there are reasons to believe that Chinese preschoolers may show more mature patterns of executive functioning than U.S. preschoolers. First, cultural psychologists have noted that Chinese parents expect children as young as 2 years old to master impulse control, whereas U.S. parents do not expect such mastery until the preschool years (Chen...

Two studies addressed whether children consider speakers' knowledge states when establishing initial word-referent links. In Study 1, forty-eight 3- and 4-year-olds were taught two novel words by a speaker who expressed either knowledge or ignorance about the words' referents. Children showed better word learning when the speaker was knowledgeable. In Study 2, forty-eight 3- and 4-year-olds were taught two novel words by a speaker who expressed uncertainty about their referents. Whether the uncertainty truly reflected ignorance, however, differed across conditions. In one condition, the speaker said he made the object himself and thus, he was knowledgeable. In the other condition, the speaker stated that the object was made by a friend and thus, expressed ignorance about it. Four-year-olds learned better in the speaker-made than in the friend-made condition; 3-year-olds, however, showed relatively poor learning in both conditions. These findings suggest that theory-of-mind developments impact word learning.

Theory of mind is claimed to develop universally among humans across cultures with vastly different folk psychologies. However, in the attempt to test and confirm a claim of universality, individual studies have been limited by small sample sizes, sample specificities, and an overwhelming focus on Anglo- European children. The current meta-analysis of children's false-belief performance provides the most comprehensive examination to date of theory-of-mind development in a population of non-Western children speaking non-Indo-European languages (i.e., Mandarin and Cantonese). The meta-analysis consisted of 196 Chinese conditions (127 from mainland China and 69 from Hong Kong), representing responses from more than 3,000 children, compared with 155 similar North American conditions (83 conditions from the United States and 72 conditions from Canada). The findings show parallel developmental trajectories of false-belief understanding for children in China and North America coupled with significant differences in the timing of development across communities-children's false-belief performance varied across different locales by as much as 2 or more years. These data support the importance of both universal trajectories and specific experiential factors in the development of theory of mind.

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Everyday understanding of human behavior rests on having a theory of mind--the ability to relate people's actions to underlying mental states such as beliefs and desires. It has been suggested that an impaired theory of mind may lie at the heart of psychological disorders that are characterized by deficits in social understanding, such as autism. In this study, we employed the event-related potential methodology to index the activity of neural systems that are engaged during theory-of-mind reasoning in adults. Specifically, neural activity elicited by tasks that required thinking about mental as compared with nonmental representations (i.e., beliefs vs. photographs) was characterized by a focally enhanced positivity over left frontal areas, which was diminished over left parietal areas. These findings provide an important perspective on both children's theory-of-mind development and the neurobiology of disorders in which theory of mind seems to be impaired.

Twenty-four 3.5-year-old children who initially showed poor performance on false-belief tasks participated in a training protocol designed to promote performance on these tasks. Our aim was to determine whether the extent to which children benefited from training was predicted by their performance on a battery of executive functioning tasks. Findings indicated that individual differences in executive functioning performance strongly and consistently predicted improvement in children's false-belief performance and their ability to appropriately explain false-belief-based behavior, both during the training period and during the posttest. These findings were robust after statistically controlling for several relevant covariates. These results are consistent with the suggestion that executive functioning skills promote developments in theory of mind by facilitating the ability to reflect upon and learn from relevant experience.