Preschoolers' theory-of-mind development follows a similar age trajectory across many cultures. To determine whether these similarities are related to similar underlying ontogenetic processes, we examined whether the relation between theory of mind and executive function commonly found among U.S. preschoolers is also present among Chinese preschoolers. Preschoolers from Beijing, China (N = 109), were administered theory-of-mind and executive-functioning tasks, and their performance was compared with that of a previously studied sample of U.S. preschoolers (N = 107). The Chinese preschoolers out-performed their U.S. counterparts on all measures of executive functioning, but were not similarly advanced in theory-of-mind reasoning. Nonetheless, individual differences in executive functioning predicted theory of mind for children in both cultures. Thus, the relation between executive functioning and theory of mind is robust across two disparate cultures. These findings shed light on why executive functioning is important for theoryof-mind development.Over the preschool years, children's understanding of their own and other individuals' mental states-that is, their theory of mind-goes though an important transition that is often indexed by their emerging understanding of false belief (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Recent findings show considerable cross-cultural synchrony in the age at which children gain facility with false-belief reasoning (Callaghan et al., 2005). It is not clear, however, whether this cross-cultural developmental synchrony can be attributed to universal developmental processes.Within Western cultures, several factors have been shown to affect the developmental timetable of false-belief and related theory-of-mind concepts. One factor believed to be particularly important is executive functioning (Carlson & Moses, 2001;Moses, 2001;Perner & Lang, 1999). Several studies of Western children have shown that their performance on false-belief and other theory-of-mind tasks can be predicted from tasks that tap executive-functioning skills such as response inhibition, cognitive conflict resolution, and working memory (Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998;Davis & Pratt, 1995;Frye, Zelazo, & Palfai, 1995;Hughes, 1998;Perner & Lang, 2000). These relations typically persist even when factors such as age and verbal ability are controlled. To begin to assess whether this Copyright © 2006 NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript developmental pathway might be universal, we examined whether the relation between executive function and theory of mind also holds in children from Beijing, China.This population is of theoretical interest because there are reasons to believe that Chinese preschoolers may show more mature patterns of executive functioning than U.S. preschoolers. First, cultural psychologists have noted that Chinese parents expect children as young as 2 years old to master impulse control, whereas U.S. parents do not expect such mastery until the preschool years (Chen...

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This study examined cross-cultural differences and similarities in children's moral understanding of individual-or collective-oriented lies and truths. Seven-, 9-, and 11-year-old Canadian and Chinese children were read stories about story characters facing moral dilemmas about whether to lie or tell the truth to help a group but harm an individual or vice versa. Participants chose to lie or to tell the truth as if they were the character (Experiments 1 and 2) and categorized and evaluated the story characters' truthful and untruthful statements (Experiments 3 and 4). Most children in both cultures labeled lies as lies and truths as truths. The major cultural differences lay in choices and moral evaluations. Chinese children chose lying to help a collective but harm an individual, and they rated it less negatively than lying with opposite consequences. Chinese children rated truth telling to help an individual but harm a group less positively than the alternative. Canadian children did the opposite. These findings suggest that cross-cultural differences in emphasis on groups versus individuals affect children's choices and moral judgments about truth and deception.Keywords cross-cultural; deception; individualism; collectivism; moral development Children around the world are socialized to adhere to the moral and social value systems of their culture and to do what is seen as right and not what is considered wrong. In many cases, the values of a culture are consistent with each other. They promote a coherent set of morally and socially acceptable behaviors. However, it is not unusual that in some situations certain cultural values collide with each other, and in such a circumstance, a moral-social dilemma Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Kang Lee, Institute of Child Study, University of Toronto, 45 Walmer Road, Toronto, Ontario M5R 2X2, Canada, or to Genyue Fu, School of Education, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, Zhejiang, People's Republic of China. E-mail: kang.lee@utoronto.ca or fugy@zjnu.cn. NIH Public Access NIH-PA Author ManuscriptNIH-PA Author Manuscript NIH-PA Author Manuscript might arise. One such dilemma is whether to tell a lie that may help a group or an individual or to speak the truth that might have the opposite effect.The question of what a lie is and whether it is wrong to lie has been a subject of intense debate among Western philosophers and theologians throughout history. There are numerous schools of thought on the issue that generally fall on a continuum. At one extreme, philosophers such as St. Augustine (1952), Kant (1949), andBok (1978) assumed that lying necessarily involves a speaker who knowingly makes a false statement with the intent to deceive. As long as a statement fits this description, it is a lie regardless of the context in which it is uttered. Also, these theorists held a deontological view of the moral implication of lying: Lying is intrinsically wrong and has a constant disvalue regardless of context. Lies must under all but the mo...

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While there has been extensive research on children's moral knowledge about lying and truthtelling and their actual lie-or truth-telling behaviors, research to examine the relationship between the 2 is extremely rare. This study examined one hundred and twenty 7-, 9-, and 11-year-olds' moral understanding of lies and their actual lying behaviors in a politeness situation. Results revealed that as age increased, children increasingly evaluated others' lying in politeness situations less negatively and were more inclined to tell lies in such situations themselves. Contrary to previous findings, children's socio-moral knowledge about lying was significantly related to their actual behaviors particularly when children's rationales underlying their moral judgments were consistent with their motives for actual lie-or truth-telling in the politeness situation. Lying and Truth-Telling in Children: From Concept to ActionLying is a common social phenomenon. It occurs regularly in various social contexts for a multitude of purposes. For children, there are two types of lies that are of great importance during their socialization. One type is the lies that violate moral rules as they are typically told to benefit oneself at the expense of others. Due to the anti-social nature of this type of lie, it is universally discouraged by children's caregivers and teachers from a very early age. The other type of lies are lies that are told with an intention to help, not harm, another individual (e.g., faking liking an undesirable gift in front of a gift-giver) and are thus prosocial in nature. Although philosophers and theologians have long debated about whether prosocial lies should be morally sanctioned (Bok, 1978), in everyday practice, such lies are told frequently (DePaulo & Bell, 1996;DePaulo & Kashy, 1998), and often entail positive values (Nyberg, 1993). Some theorists such as Sweetser (1987) have even suggested that in some situations prosocial lies are not only socially acceptable but also are not lies at all.There has been extensive research on the development of lying which dates back to the beginning of developmental psychology (e.g., Binet, 1896;Darwin, 1877;Piaget, 1932). This longstanding interest in this topic is due to the fact that lying can serve as a window into many aspects of children's developing minds, for example, intelligence (Binet, 1896;Lewis, 1993), theory of mind (Chandler, Fritz, & Hala, 1989;Leekam, 1993;Peskin, 1992;Peterson, 1995;Peterson, Peterson, & Seeto, 1983;Polak & Harris, 1999;Sodian, 1991, Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007), moral understanding (Piaget, 1932 (Hartshorne & May, 1928), and children's competence as witnesses in the courts of law (Goodman et al., 2006;Lyon, 2000;Strichartz & Burton, 1990;Talwar, Lee, Bala & Lindsay, 2002; for a review, see Lee, 2000). Research on Antisocial LyingTo date, most studies have focused on the development of antisocial lies and can be divided into two major streams. One stream investigates children's conceptions and moral judgments of antisocial li...