Source monitoring involves attributing information to one of several sources. Schemas are known to influence source-monitoring processes, with enhanced memory for schematically unexpected sources (inconsistency effect) and biased schema-consistent source guessing. The authors investigated whether this guessing bias reflects a compensatory guessing strategy based on metacognitive awareness of the inconsistency effect, or reflects other strategies as proposed by the probability-matching account. To determine people's awareness of the inconsistency effect, the authors investigated metamemory predictions in a source-monitoring task. In four experiments, participants studied object word items that were presented with one of two scene labels as sources. Items were either presented with their schematically expected source (e.g., kitchen-oven) or with their schematically unexpected source (e.g., kitchen-toothpaste). In Experiments 1 and 2, participants predicted their item memory and their source memory after each source-item presentation. In Experiment 1, people incorrectly predicted both their item memory and, even more so, their source memory to be better for expected than for unexpected source-item pairs. In Experiment 2, this effect replicated with different types of judgment probes. Crucially, item-wise memory predictions did not predict source guessing. In Experiment 3, metacognitive awareness of the inconsistency effect on source memory changed during the test phase. However, metamemory convictions never predicted source guessing. In Experiment 4, the authors manipulated participants' convictions concerning the impact of schematic expectations on source memory. These convictions also did not predict source guessing. Thus, the results show that schema-consistent source guessing does not reflect a compensatory strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record

No abstract

People do not always have accurate metacognitive awareness of the conditions that lead to good source memory. In Experiment 1, participants studied words referring to bathroom and kitchen items that were either paired with an expected or unexpected room as the source. Participants provided judgments of item and source learning after each item-source pair. In line with previous studies, participants incorrectly predicted their memory to be better for expected than for unexpected sources. Here, we show that this metamemory expectancy illusion generalizes to socially relevant stimuli. In Experiment 2, participants played a prisoner's dilemma game with trustworthy-looking and untrustworthy-looking partners who either cooperated or cheated. After each round of the game, participants provided metamemory judgments about how well they were going to remember the partner's face and behavior. On average, participants predicted their source memory to be better for behaviors that were expected based on the facial appearances of the partners. This stands in contrast to the established finding that veridical source memory is better for unexpected than expected information. Asking participants to provide metamemory judgments at encoding selectively enhanced source memory for the expected information. These results are consistent with how schematic expectations affect source memory and metamemory for nonsocial information, suggesting that both are governed by general rather than by domain-specific principles. Differences between experiments may be linked to the fact that people may have special beliefs about memory for social stimuli, such as the belief that cheaters are particularly memorable (Experiment 3).

No abstract

No abstract