Metamemory expectancy illusion and schema-consistent guessing in source monitoring.

Abstract

Source monitoring involves attributing information to one of several sources. Schemas are known to influence source-monitoring processes, with enhanced memory for schematically unexpected sources (inconsistency effect) and biased schema-consistent source guessing. The authors investigated whether this guessing bias reflects a compensatory guessing strategy based on metacognitive awareness of the inconsistency effect, or reflects other strategies as proposed by the probability-matching account. To determine people's awareness of the inconsistency effect, the authors investigated metamemory predictions in a source-monitoring task. In four experiments, participants studied object word items that were presented with one of two scene labels as sources. Items were either presented with their schematically expected source (e.g., kitchen-oven) or with their schematically unexpected source (e.g., kitchen-toothpaste). In Experiments 1 and 2, participants predicted their item memory and their source memory after each source-item presentation. In Experiment 1, people incorrectly predicted both their item memory and, even more so, their source memory to be better for expected than for unexpected source-item pairs. In Experiment 2, this effect replicated with different types of judgment probes. Crucially, item-wise memory predictions did not predict source guessing. In Experiment 3, metacognitive awareness of the inconsistency effect on source memory changed during the test phase. However, metamemory convictions never predicted source guessing. In Experiment 4, the authors manipulated participants' convictions concerning the impact of schematic expectations on source memory. These convictions also did not predict source guessing. Thus, the results show that schema-consistent source guessing does not reflect a compensatory strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record

Memory and metamemory for social interactions: Evidence for a metamemory expectancy illusion

“…Specifically, source memory is enhanced when a cheater has a trustworthy facial appearance (Bell, Buchner, Kroneisen, & Giang, 2012;Mieth, Bell, & Buchner, 2016). Such an expectancy violation effect on source memory has been found for nonsocial stimuli as well (Küppers & Bayen, 2014;Schaper, Kuhlmann, & Bayen, 2019a, 2019b. However, people are not metacognitively aware of this effect (Schaper et al, 2019a(Schaper et al, , 2019b.…”

“…Such an expectancy violation effect on source memory has been found for nonsocial stimuli as well (Küppers & Bayen, 2014;Schaper, Kuhlmann, & Bayen, 2019a, 2019b. However, people are not metacognitively aware of this effect (Schaper et al, 2019a(Schaper et al, , 2019b. Instead, they are prone to a metamemory expectancy illusion as they predict memory for schematically expected information to be particularly good.…”

“…As yet, people's metamemory beliefs about source memory have only been examined using nonsocial stimuli. Specifically, Schaper et al (2019aSchaper et al ( , 2019b showed participants words that referred to bathroom or kitchen items. The items were either presented with their schematically expected source (e.g., "oven in the kitchen") or with an unexpected source (e.g., "frying pan in the bathroom").…”

“…However, actual guessing-corrected source memory was better for unexpected than for expected sources. Schaper et al (2019aSchaper et al ( , 2019b attributed this metamemory expectancy illusion to global beliefs about the effects of relatedness on memory (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013) and to an increased encoding fluency of the related item-source pairs (Undorf & Erdfelder, 2011. People hold the global belief that expected information is better remembered than is unexpected information (cf.…”

“…Ironically, veridical memory is often better for material that is more difficult to process because it requires more elaboration (e.g., Besken & Mulligan, 2013;Bjork, 1994;Rhodes & Castel, 2008;Yue, Castel, & Bjork, 2013). In source memory, people seem to fall prone to a metamemory illusion in that they systematically overestimate source memory for expected compared with unexpected sources (Schaper et al, 2019a(Schaper et al, , 2019b.…”