The authors investigated conditions under which judgments in source-monitoring tasks are influenced by prior schematic knowledge. According to a probability-matching account of source guessing (Spaniol & Bayen, 2002), when people do not remember the source of information, they match source guessing probabilities to the perceived contingency between sources and item types. When they do not have a representation of a contingency, they base their guesses on prior schematic knowledge. The authors provide support for this account in two experiments with sources presenting information that was expected for one source and somewhat unexpected for another. Schema-relevant information about the sources was provided at the time of encoding. When contingency perception was impeded by dividing attention, participants showed schema-based guessing (Experiment 1). Manipulating source - item contingency also affected guessing (Experiment 2). When this contingency was schema-inconsistent, it superseded schema-based expectations and led to schema-inconsistent guessing.

Source monitoring involves attributing information to one of several sources. Schemas are known to influence source-monitoring processes, with enhanced memory for schematically unexpected sources (inconsistency effect) and biased schema-consistent source guessing. The authors investigated whether this guessing bias reflects a compensatory guessing strategy based on metacognitive awareness of the inconsistency effect, or reflects other strategies as proposed by the probability-matching account. To determine people's awareness of the inconsistency effect, the authors investigated metamemory predictions in a source-monitoring task. In four experiments, participants studied object word items that were presented with one of two scene labels as sources. Items were either presented with their schematically expected source (e.g., kitchen-oven) or with their schematically unexpected source (e.g., kitchen-toothpaste). In Experiments 1 and 2, participants predicted their item memory and their source memory after each source-item presentation. In Experiment 1, people incorrectly predicted both their item memory and, even more so, their source memory to be better for expected than for unexpected source-item pairs. In Experiment 2, this effect replicated with different types of judgment probes. Crucially, item-wise memory predictions did not predict source guessing. In Experiment 3, metacognitive awareness of the inconsistency effect on source memory changed during the test phase. However, metamemory convictions never predicted source guessing. In Experiment 4, the authors manipulated participants' convictions concerning the impact of schematic expectations on source memory. These convictions also did not predict source guessing. Thus, the results show that schema-consistent source guessing does not reflect a compensatory strategy. (PsycINFO Database Record

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Two experiments examined reliance on schematic knowledge in source monitoring. Based on a probability-matching account of source guessing, a schema bias will only emerge if participants do not have a representation of the source-item contingency in the study list, or if the perceived contingency is consistent with schematic expectations. Thus, the account predicts that encoding conditions that affect contingency detection also affect schema bias. In Experiment 1, the schema bias commonly found when schematic information about the sources is not provided before encoding was diminished by an intentional source-memory instruction. In Experiment 2, the depth of processing of schema-consistent and schema-inconsistent source-item pairings was manipulated. Participants consequently overestimated the occurrence of the pairing type they processed in a deep manner, and their source guessing reflected this biased contingency perception. Results support the probability-matching account of source guessing.

Experience-based cues, such as perceptual fluency, have long been thought to influence metacognitive judgments (Kelley & Jacoby, 1996; Koriat, 1997). Studies found that manipulations of perceptual fluency via changes in font and volume alter Judgments of Learning (JOLs) without influencing memory performance (Rhodes & Castel, 2008, 2009). Nonetheless, recent research (Mueller, Tauber, & Dunlosky, 2013; Mueller, Dunlosky, Tauber, & Rhodes, 2014, 2016) has challenged the notion that experience-based cues such as fluency are the primary basis for item-level JOLs, arguing instead that preexisting beliefs about these manipulations are responsible for these effects. For the first time, we compared global metacognitive judgments to item-level JOLs made during study to independently assess the contribution of beliefs and experience to volume-effects on JOLs. In 3 experiments, we found evidence for strong beliefs about volume-effects on memory, both before and after a study-test phase. However, these beliefs either did not account for the volume effect on JOLs (Experiment 3) or only partially accounted for the volume effect on JOLs (Experiments 1 and 2). Further, in Experiments 2 and 3 global performance estimates (before and after study) did not differ with respect to the volume dose whereas item-level JOLs generally varied with dose strength. Taken together, our findings suggest that both beliefs and experience-based cues contribute independently to the effects of volume on item-level JOLs, but that beliefs alone cannot fully account for the effects of volume on item-level JOLs. (PsycINFO Database Record