This paper is written from a perspective that is sympathetic to the basic idea of the capability approach. Our aim is to compare Martha Nussbaum's capability theory of justice with Alan Gewirth's moral theory, on two points: the selection and the justification of a list of central capabilities. On both counts, we contend that Nussbaum's theory suffers from flaws that Gewirth's theory may help to remedy. First, we argue that her notion of a (dignified) human life cannot fulfill the role of a normative criterion that Nussbaum wants it to play in selecting capabilities for her list. Second, we question whether Nussbaum's method of justification is adequate, discussing both her earlier self-validating argumentative strategy and her more recent adherence to the device of an overlapping consensus. We conclude that both strategies fail to provide the capabilities theory with the firm foundation it requires. Next, we turn to Gewirth's normative theory and discuss how it can repair these flaws. We show how his theory starts from a fundamental moral principle according to which all agents have rights to the protection of the necessary preconditions of their agency. Gewirth's justification of this principle is then presented, using a version of a transcendental argument. Finally, we explicitly compare Nussbaum and Gewirth and briefly demonstrate what it would mean for Nussbaum to incorporate Gewirthian elements into her capabilities theory of justice.
3O r i g i n a l a r b e i t Zusammenfassung Der einsatz empirischer Forschungsmethoden in der Medizinethik hat zu Forderungen nach einem gewandelten Selbstverständnis der Medizinethik geführt, die sich mehr als eine integrierte Disziplin aus Sozialwissenschaften und ethik verstehen solle. Dagegen wird hier die these vertreten, dass über Sinn und Unsinn des einsatzes empirischer Methoden zunächst eine moralphilosophische Diskussion erforderlich ist. Medizinethiker müssen ausweisen können, welche empirischen Forschungsresultate zur beantwortung normativer Fragen erforderlich sind. ein solcher ausweis beruht seinerseits jedoch auf normativen annahmen, die ihrerseits moralphilosophischer legitimation bedürfen. Der beitrag untersucht daher den einsatz empirischer Methoden in der Medizinethik im Hinblick auf Verhältnis von ethischem grundlagendiskurs und Methodologie der angewandten ethik. abschließend wird gefragt, ob nicht ein großteil von empirischen Studien in der Medizinethik aus forschungsethischen gründen problematisch ist. Schlüsselwörter empirische ethik · Sozialwissenschaften · interdisziplinarität · ethische Methodologie · Metaethik What does medical ethics need empirical methods for? an inquiry in normative ethicsAbstract Definition of the problem the use of empirical methods in medical ethics and bioethics has generated proposals for reconceptualizing medical ethics as a discipline that integrates ethics and social science. Arguments the position taken in the present paper, by contrast, is that what is needed, in the first place, is a moral-philosophical evaluation of when it makes sense to employ empirical methods. Medical ethicists must demonstrate what empirical research is necessary for answering normative questions. any such justification will, however, necessarily rely on normative assumptions that, for their part, M. Düwell require moral-philosophical justification. The paper examines the use of empirical methods in medical ethics in terms of the appropriate relationship between the methodology of applied ethics and debates over the foundations of ethics. the paper concludes by raising the question of whether it is not the case that most empirical studies in medical ethics are of dubious merit, by the accepted standards of research ethics.
Parents' preferences for unsolicited findings (UFs) from diagnostic whole-exome sequencing (WES) for their children remain largely unexplored. Our aim was to gain insight into parental considerations favoring acceptance/decline of UFs pertaining to their child. We conducted 20 qualitative, semistructured interviews with parents (n = 34) of children with a developmental delay, aged o1 to 17 years, after consenting to WES, but before feedback of results. Key findings from our study were that all parents favored acceptance of UFs for medically actionable conditions in childhood, but that preferences and considerations diverged for UFs with no medical actionability, or only in adulthood, and regarding carrier-status. Sometimes non-medical utility considerations (considerations of usefulness of knowing UFs, not rooted in (preventive) medical treatment or controls) were given in favor of disclosure of UFs. Sometimes the child's future autonomy formed a reason to withhold UFs at present, despite an unfavorable prognosis concerning the child's cognitive capabilities. Some parents only preferred receiving UFs if these findings were directly related to their reasons for seeking a diagnosis. These findings are essential for developing morally responsible policy and for counseling. Further research should focus on whether considerations of non-medical utility alone can justify disclosure of UFs and whether reasons for seeking a diagnosis place further constraints on what UFs may be returned/withheld. How parents can be aided in contemplating different scenarios regarding their child's future development also deserves further inquiry.
Citation for published item:feyleveldD hery k nd h¤ uwellD w r us nd p hnD endre s @PHISA 9 hy nd how should we represent future gener tions in poli ym kingc9D turispruden eFD T @QAF ppF SRWESTTF Further information on publisher's website: Additional information:Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. IntroductionIt is very likely that our current actions will adversely affect the ability of future generations (those that do not yet exist) to flourish. The primary question for this paper is whether we have duties to modify our behavior to try to ameliorate these negative consequences by taking the interests of future generations into account in our policy making. More specifically, do future generations have rights that we must recognize? To answer this question affirmatively,we must show that we can take the rights-relevant interests of future generations into account, which we can only do if we know what interests they will have. In any event, to be practically relevant, any affirmative answer must specify how to take these interests into account without undermining the structure of democratic decision-making.We will argue that this means that we should derive directions about political representation Our argument rests on the presumption that there are human rights, which belong to humans simply because they have the characteristics that make them human. It is clear that if there are such rights then future humans will have them as much as we do, regardless of how they might differ from us. To deny that future humans have the same human rights as we do is to deny that there are human rights at all. However, beyond the idea that human rights are held simply by virtue of being human, there is room for debate about the content and form of these rights. Without further analysis, we cannot specify just what it means to grant human rights to future generations and to take their interests into account. Equally, without further analysis, 1 The work reported on in this publication has benefited from participation in the research networking programme Rights to a Green Future, which is financed by the European Science Foundation.2 we cannot specify how the interests of future generations might/ought to be integrated into the structure of democratic decision-making.Part One analyzes the main challenges to the idea of representing future generations in policy making. Part Two introduces a framework to elaborate what it means for an agent to have basic rights and how this idea can be founded philosophically. Part Three sho...
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