The paper develops ethical guidelines for the development and usage of persuasive technologies (PT) that can be derived from applying discourse ethics to this type of technologies. The application of discourse ethics is of particular interest for PT, since ‘persuasion’ refers to an act of communication that might be interpreted as holding the middle between ‘manipulation’ and ‘convincing’. One can distinguish two elements of discourse ethics that prove fruitful when applied to PT: the analysis of the inherent normativity of acts of communication (‘speech acts’) and the Habermasian distinction between ‘communicative’ and ‘strategic rationality’ and their broader societal interpretation. This essay investigates what consequences can be drawn if one applies these two elements of discourse ethics to PT.
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In this paper we discuss the hypothesis that, ‘moral agency is distributed over both humans and technological artefacts’, recently proposed by Peter-Paul Verbeek. We present some arguments for thinking that Verbeek is mistaken. We argue that artefacts such as bridges, word processors, or bombs can never be (part of) moral agents. After having discussed some possible responses, as well as a moderate view proposed by Illies and Meijers, we conclude that technological artefacts are neutral tools that are at most bearers of instrumental value.
The UN Agenda 2030 lends itself to an interpretation in light of the human rights framework and related contractualist ethical theories. These frameworks have been developed in the context of Western individualism. This paper analyses the sustainable development goals in light of the debate between human rights on the one side and the rights of nature on the other side. It argues that human rights are often (though not exclusively) linked to social contract theories. The paper points out strengths and weaknesses of contractualist individualism. It discusses various challenges to the contractualist framework. How can contractualist individualism deal with the representation of future generations? What assumptions does the social contract make with regard to the nature of the individual? Should we conceive of them, e.g., as utility maximizers or as idealized rational agents? A final weakness of the framework is that contractualism seems to ignore other values, especially the value of nature. The paper therefore sketches recent developments in ethical theory that attempt to go beyond Western individualism.
Citation for published item:feyleveldD hery k nd h¤ uwellD w r us nd p hnD endre s @PHISA 9 hy nd how should we represent future gener tions in poli ym kingc9D turispruden eFD T @QAF ppF SRWESTTF Further information on publisher's website: Additional information:Use policyThe full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-pro t purposes provided that:• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. IntroductionIt is very likely that our current actions will adversely affect the ability of future generations (those that do not yet exist) to flourish. The primary question for this paper is whether we have duties to modify our behavior to try to ameliorate these negative consequences by taking the interests of future generations into account in our policy making. More specifically, do future generations have rights that we must recognize? To answer this question affirmatively,we must show that we can take the rights-relevant interests of future generations into account, which we can only do if we know what interests they will have. In any event, to be practically relevant, any affirmative answer must specify how to take these interests into account without undermining the structure of democratic decision-making.We will argue that this means that we should derive directions about political representation Our argument rests on the presumption that there are human rights, which belong to humans simply because they have the characteristics that make them human. It is clear that if there are such rights then future humans will have them as much as we do, regardless of how they might differ from us. To deny that future humans have the same human rights as we do is to deny that there are human rights at all. However, beyond the idea that human rights are held simply by virtue of being human, there is room for debate about the content and form of these rights. Without further analysis, we cannot specify just what it means to grant human rights to future generations and to take their interests into account. Equally, without further analysis, 1 The work reported on in this publication has benefited from participation in the research networking programme Rights to a Green Future, which is financed by the European Science Foundation.2 we cannot specify how the interests of future generations might/ought to be integrated into the structure of democratic decision-making.Part One analyzes the main challenges to the idea of representing future generations in policy making. Part Two introduces a framework to elaborate what it means for an agent to have basic rights and how this idea can be founded philosophically. Part Three sho...
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