The Foundations of Capability Theory: Comparing Nussbaum and Gewirth

Abstract

This paper is written from a perspective that is sympathetic to the basic idea of the capability approach. Our aim is to compare Martha Nussbaum's capability theory of justice with Alan Gewirth's moral theory, on two points: the selection and the justification of a list of central capabilities. On both counts, we contend that Nussbaum's theory suffers from flaws that Gewirth's theory may help to remedy. First, we argue that her notion of a (dignified) human life cannot fulfill the role of a normative criterion that Nussbaum wants it to play in selecting capabilities for her list. Second, we question whether Nussbaum's method of justification is adequate, discussing both her earlier self-validating argumentative strategy and her more recent adherence to the device of an overlapping consensus. We conclude that both strategies fail to provide the capabilities theory with the firm foundation it requires. Next, we turn to Gewirth's normative theory and discuss how it can repair these flaws. We show how his theory starts from a fundamental moral principle according to which all agents have rights to the protection of the necessary preconditions of their agency. Gewirth's justification of this principle is then presented, using a version of a transcendental argument. Finally, we explicitly compare Nussbaum and Gewirth and briefly demonstrate what it would mean for Nussbaum to incorporate Gewirthian elements into her capabilities theory of justice.

2. Core Ideas and the Framework

“…The capability approach proper need not endorse a strong account of agency, but there are several scholars who have developed particular capability theories and applications in which agency plays a central role (e.g. Claassen and Düwell 2013;Trommlerová, Klasen and Leßmann 2015).…”

“…23 Dworkin's egalitarian justice theory starts from the meta-principle of equal respect and concern, which he then develops in the principles that the distribution of burdens and benefits should be sensitive to the ambitions that people have but should not reflect the unequal natural endowments with which individuals are born (Dworkin 1981(Dworkin , 2000. One could also develop a capability theory of justice arguing that the ultimate driving force is a concern with agency ( Claassen and Düwell 2013; or with human dignity ). If capability scholars want to develop a full theory of justice, they will also need to explain on what bases they justify their principles or claims.…”

Playing for social equality

“…Most notably, the capability for play is included by Martha Nussbaum in her well-known list of central human capabilities (Nussbaum, 2000: 78–80; 2011: 33–34). But in a political-philosophical context, the play-item on Nussbaum’s list has been much criticized either for being less important and hence less defendable than the other listed items or for being a clear expression of Nussbaum’s perfectionism (Claassen, 2011; 2017; Claassen and Düwell, 2013; Den Uyl and Rasmussen, 2009; Nelson, 2008).…”

An Agency‐Based Capability Theory of Justice

“…An exception is Hübenthal (, 302), who discusses the close relation between Nussbaum's capability theory and Gewirth's theory of agency. See also Claassen and Düwell ().…”