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Communication situation, position value, characterization, C71,

We study a situation where several independent service providers collaborate by complete pooling of their resources and customer streams into a joint service system. These service providers may represent such diverse organizations as hospitals that pool beds, call centers that share telephone operators, or maintenance firms that pool repairmen. We model the service systems as Erlang delay systems (M/M/s queues) that face a fixed cost rate per server and homogeneous delay costs for waiting customers. We examine rules to fairly allocate the collective costs of the pooled system amongst the participants by applying concepts from cooperative game theory. We consider both the case where players' numbers of servers are exogenously given and the scenario where any coalition picks an optimal number of servers. By exploiting new analytical properties of the continuous extension of the classic Erlang delay function, we provide sufficient conditions for the games under consideration to possess a core allocation (i.e., an allocation that gives no group of players an incentive to split off and form a separate pool) and to admit a population monotonic allocation scheme (whereby adding extra players does not make anyone worse off). This is not guaranteed in general, as illustrated via examples.

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Quantity-dependent part of the utility of Sales v i Error term specific to subject or product i v Value function of prospect theorȳ v Value function of reference point model w First derivative of the distortion function of Sales ξ Trust factor Z Random variable in trust model xvi This thesis is an extended version of Scheele et al. (2017), which is joint work with Ulrich Thonemann and Marco Slikker. It benefited from the comments of four anonymous referees and the editors of Management Science. Preliminary research results have been presented at the following conferences:

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This study considers a supply chain that consists of n retailers, each of them facing a newsvendor problem, m warehouses and a supplier. The retailers are supplied with a single product via some warehouses. In these warehouses, the ordered amounts of goods of these retailers become available after some lead time. At the time that the goods arrive at the warehouses, demand realizations are known by the retailers. The retailers can increase their expected joint profits by coordinating their orders and making allocations after demand realization. For this setting, we consider an associated cooperative game between the retailers. We show that this associated cooperative game has a nonempty core. Finally, we study a variant of this game, where the retailers are allowed to leave unsold goods at the warehouses.