Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory

“…The axiom states that i s payoff should be the same in both games. Now we will introduce some preliminaries for CO games (for a literature review on CO games see Slikker and van den Nouweland [23] [4], and the average tree solution [5]. From S we construct S L in the following way: …”

Section: Axiom 8 (Wn)mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Generalized wH Value

Hiller¹

2014

TEL

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“…The SV gives a normative and unique solution to the problem of allocating the worth of a group of agents working together, a coalition, by defining a share that is based on the average marginal contribution of each player to each possible coalition. For these reasons, the SV can be interpreted as the expected value of cooperating [31] and thus it seems an appropriate proxy for the likely distributional impact of the policy schemes here analyzed. The NH solution attributes the share of the grand coalition worth depending on the disagreement points that are defined by the non-cooperative outcomes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing Collective Measures in Rural Policy: The Effect of Minimum Participation Rules on the Distribution of Benefits from Irrigation Infrastructure

2016

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Despite the increasing interest from both policy makers and scholars in the collective management of natural resources in the rural sector, the literature has not covered many aspects of the incentives targeting collective actors. In this article, we analyze how embedding minimum participation rules in rural policies affect the distribution of benefits of a group of players that cooperate. The article applies the Shapley Value and the Nash-Harsanyi solution, two of the key solutions of cooperative game theory, to an incentive scheme in Emilia-Romagna (Italy) to support the construction of collective reservoirs for irrigation water. Results show that rules on the minimum storage capacity and on the minimum number of users affect the benefit distribution in opposite directions. The main conclusion of the article is that minimum participation rules should be carefully designed if welfare distribution is an issue. However, further studies are required to have a comprehensive assessment of minimum participation rules within rural policies.

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Social and Economic Networks in Cooperative Game Theory

Cited by 129 publications

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Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Among Supply Chain Agents: Review and Extensions

Game-Theoretic Analysis of Cooperation Among Supply Chain Agents: Review and Extensions

The Generalized wH Value

Assessing Collective Measures in Rural Policy: The Effect of Minimum Participation Rules on the Distribution of Benefits from Irrigation Infrastructure

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