Cooperation between Multiple Newsvendors with Warehouses

Özen, Ulaş; Fransoo, Jan C.; Norde, Henk; Slikker, Marco

doi:10.2139/ssrn.557825

Cited by 25 publications

(34 citation statements)

References 9 publications

(7 reference statements)

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“…The papers show that the core of any general news-vendor game of this type is non-empty. In Ozen et al (2004), the benefit of pooling the inventories at the retailers after demand realization is analyzed in a more complex supply chain. The core of the associated cooperative game is shown to be non-empty.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in Service Systems

Anily

Haviv

2010

Operations Research

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We consider a number of servers that may improve the efficiency of the system by pooling their service capacities to serve the union of the individual streams of customers. This economies of scope phenomenon is due to the reduction in the steady-state mean total number of customers in system. The question we pose is how the servers should split among themselves the cost of the pooled system. When the individual incoming streams of customers form Poisson processes and individual service times are exponential, we define a transferable utility cooperative game in which the cost of a coalition is the mean number of customers (or jobs) in the pooled system. We show that albeit the fact the characteristic function is neither monotone nor concave, the game (and its subgames) possess non-empty cores. In other words, for any subset of servers there exist cost-sharing allocations under which no partial subset can take advantage by breaking away and forming a separate coalition. We give an explicit expression for all (infinitely many) non-negative core cost allocations of this game. Finally, we show that except for the case where all individual servers have the same cost, there exist infinitely many core allocations with negative entries, and we show how to construct a convex subset of the core where at least one server is being paid in order to join the grand coalition.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation in Service Systems

Anily

Haviv

2010

Operations Research

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“…There is also research concerning the inventory management ( [10], [11], [12] and [13]) or transport ( [14] and [15]). Nevertheless, the works combining supply chain of blood and game theory remain rare.…”

Section: State Of the Artmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The constraint (11) corresponds to the rationality of the players, the constraint (12) ensures that the sum of the costs assigned to each player of a coalition k is equal to the optimal cost of this coalition C k . The constraint (13) ensures that each player is part of a single coalition. And finally the constraint (14) defines the binary nature of x k and the positivity of u j,k .…”

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confidence: 99%

Model based on Hybridized Game Theory to Optimize Logistics: Case of Blood Supply Chain

Mouatassim¹,

Ahlaqqach²,

Benhra³

et al. 2016

IJCA

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Several researches have been done to optimize different flows in blood supply chain. However, the use of game theory in this sense is rare. The following work focus on the case of Morocco, consisting of 16 Regional Blood Transfusion Centers (RBTC) centralized around a National Blood Transfusion and Hematology Center (NBTHC). An approach based on hybridized game theory is adopted to form core and strongly stable coalitions and optimize as much as possible the transport cost. Firstly, the optimal cost of each coalition of the 33 possible coalitions; that the Director of NBTHC validated; is computed by using a mixed integer linear Programming model (MILP). Then these costs are introduced as data of two other MILP to define which structure minimizes the total cost allocated to each RTBC while maintaining core stability, in the case of the first MILP, and strong equilibrium in the case of the second. The VRPPDTW is also introduced within each coalition in order to optimize the cost of transport more. General TermsMixed integer linear programming, logistics, game theory.

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“…These are core non-emptiness, computational ease and justifiability. The core concept, a measure of stability, has also received special interest by several other papers and the core non-emptiness has been shown for different newsvendor settings: newsvendors with a common pool of inventory (Hartman et al, 2000;Müller et al, 2002;Slikker et al, 2001), and newsvendors with lateral transshipment or multiple channels of supply (Slikker et al, 2005;Özen et al, 2008;Chen and Zhang, 2009). All of these studies assume complete pooling of inventory, i.e., inventory can be diverted to satisfy demand that creates the highest profit from any stock point.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We are first interested in the stability of this type of cooperation and focus on the core concept as many papers in the literature (see Hartman et al, 2000;Müller et al, 2002;Slikker et al, 2001;Slikker et al, 2005;Özen et al, 2008). The core concept considers a natural criterion for stability that is each retailer should do better in the coalition than pursuing any of their alternatives, i.e., working alone or forming another coalition.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Stability and monotonicity in newsvendor situations

Özen¹,

Erkip

Slikker

2012

European Journal of Operational Research

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a b s t r a c tThis study considers a supply chain that consists of n retailers, each of them facing a newsvendor problem, and a supplier. Groups of retailers might increase their expected joint profit by joint ordering and inventory centralization. However, we assume that the retailers impose some level of stock that should be dedicated to them. In this situation, we show that the associated cooperative game has a non-empty core. Afterwards, we concentrate on a dynamic situation, where several model cost parameters and the retailers' dedicated stock levels can change. We investigate how the profit division might be affected by these changes. We focus on four monotonicity properties. We identify several classes of games with retailers, where some of the monotonicity properties hold. Moreover, we show that pairs of cooperative games associated with newsvendor situations do not necessarily satisfy these properties in general, when changes in dedicated stock levels are in concern.

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Cooperation between Multiple Newsvendors with Warehouses

Cited by 25 publications

References 9 publications

Cooperation in Service Systems

Cooperation in Service Systems

Model based on Hybridized Game Theory to Optimize Logistics: Case of Blood Supply Chain

Stability and monotonicity in newsvendor situations

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