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Attacks on academic freedom in Turkey have become increasingly systematic in recent years and thousands of academics have been dismissed. This study reflects on the effects of this worsening repression through interviews with academics in the social sciences, both those dismissed and those still active in their profession. Although the dismissed academics are socially in a very precarious position, they are continuing their scholarly activities in alternative, underground forms. This resistance stands in contrast to the accommodation and self-censorship that seem, according to the interviewees, to prevail in university departments.

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This study is based on interviews with three former Swedish jihadists, and it uses cognitive dissonance theory to analyze how their motivations for jihad changed-from the early stages of radicalization to fighting as part of a jihadist group and finally leaving jihad. It argues that cognitive dissonance is a causal mechanism, alternative to empathy and collective relative deprivation, that can explain how individuals with collective identities can be motivated to opt for jihad. For none of the interviewees did fundamentalist Islam provide a gateway into jihadism, nor did they seem to use Islam as a mere justification for violent behavior. Cognitive dissonance can also shed light on why some jihadists have not been susceptible to further radicalization by accepting even more radical ideas.

Jihadism is a complex social phenomenon that changes people, but not always uniformly. This article argues that cognitive and behavioral radicalization can be seen as a discursive journey or jihadiship involving (e)merging ideas, problems, and solutions that change with encounters with new circumstances-both material and immaterial. The differences observed between various generations of jihadists are one manifestation of this complexity. Especially in a jihadi group, the processes of radicalization are bound to continue and take new forms, compared with those experienced in the West. Another example of the complexity of jihadiship is that not only can radical ideas lead to radical behavior, but also radical behavior can increasingly give rise to radical ideas in jihadi groups. ARTICLE HISTORYWhy do some Muslims residing in the West become radicalized, harboring extremist beliefs and a desire for fast and fundamental sociopolitical change (i.e., cognitive radicalization) and even resorting to violence to achieve this change (i.e., behavioral radicalization)? 1 Can knowledge of this radicalization process help us understand the prospects and challenges of deradicalization when fighters return from foreign conflict zones? Personal and collective grievances, networks and interpersonal ties, political and religious ideologies, and enabling environments and support structures have been associated with radicalization. 2 Still, we know little about Islamic radicalization in the West and the results of various studies are sometimes conflicting, often as concerns the role of education, class, family situation, and prior criminality. 3 Even less is known about why people become deradicalized. 4 The possible variables associated with radicalization are many. One group of scholars, with roots in French sociology, concentrates on sociological background factors such as globalization and the dissolution of traditional communities and identities. From this perspective, radicalization takes place when individuals try to reconstruct their identities in a hostile and perplexing world. In particular, second-generation Muslim immigrants can experience a double sense of non-belonging, if they do not feel part of their parents' communities in their home countries and experience socioeconomic exclusion and racism in the West. 5 This can lead them to opt for an identity involving membership in the abstract community of the ummah, the global Muslim nation, whom the jihadist group claims to represent.

This study analyzes the creation of primary unit cohesion among the Kurdish Peshmerga soldiers fighting the Islamic State in northern Iraq and among Hezbollah fighters active in Syria. For this comparative study, Kurdish soldiers were interviewed on three fronts outside Mosul, Erbil, and Kirkuk in February 2015 and May 2016, and Hezbollah fighters were interviewed in Lebanon in March 2016. In contrast to many studies’ depictions of unit cohesion as relating to shared experiences of training and battle, this study argues that the Kurdish soldiers also import into their units various ideas relating to Kurdish identity. These include ideas about nationalism and religion produced through discourses within the Kurdish military and society. However, Hezbollah seeks to minimize political damage in the multisectarian political context in Lebanon while conducting domestically contested military operations abroad. This has led to a downplaying of the sectarian aspects of the conflict, which could be imported from the Shia community to increase unit cohesion, and to an ideological framing of the conflict. The general ideas circulating in society and the political context therefore matter for the strategies that can be used to increase primary unit cohesion and soldiers’ fighting power.

This study analyzes the experiences and identities of Kurdish women fighting the Islamic State (IS) in northern Iraq as part of the Peshmerga Army. The case is especially interesting because these women have engaged in ground combat and because there is an empirical gap in knowledge, especially concerning Muslim women’s experiences as soldiers. Wars bring great destruction but can also catalyze social change. While seeking balance between their identities as good mothers and professional soldiers, many Kurdish women see their war participation as a chance to increase their agency and improve equality in society, as combat operations create a window of opportunity to change perceptions of women’s roles. Women soldiers still face prejudices and feel that they must prove their worth as fearless warriors in ground combat. However, interviewed soldiers said that they were not striving for equality but equivalency, stressing those qualities that women in particular can contribute in battle.

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