No abstract

Ballot position effects have been documented across a variety of political and electoral systems. In general, knowledge of the underlying mechanisms is limited. There is also little research on such effects in preferential-list PR systems, in which parties typically present ranked lists and thus signaling is important. This study addresses both gaps. Theoretically, we formalize four models of voter decision-making: pure appeal-based utility maximization, implying no position effects; rank-taking, where voters take cues from ballot position per se; satisficing, where choice is a function of appeal, but voters consider the options in the order of their appearance; and a hybrid "satisficing-with-rank-taking" variant. From these, we derive differential observable implications. Empirically, we exploit a quasi-experiment, created by the mixed-member electoral system that is used in the state of Bavaria, Germany. Particular electoral rules induce variation in both the observed rank and the set of competitors, and allow for estimating effects at all ranks. We find clear evidence for substantial position effects, which are strongest near the top, but discernible even for the 15th list position. In addition, a candidate's vote increases when the average appeal of higher-placed (but not that of lower-placed) competitors is lower. Overall, the evidence is most compatible with the hybrid satisficing-with rank-taking model. Ballot position thus affects both judgment and choice of candidates.

Almost all regulatory policy stops at the national border. Thus, when conducting business abroad, the behaviour of firms i s r egulated b y t heir h ost, n ot t heir home country. Yet, international institutions have issued (non-binding) codes of conduct on social/environmental aspects of firm behaviour, and various high-income countries discuss how to improve extraterritorial firm b ehaviour -w ith h igh p olitical contestation over the appropriate mix of state intervention and corporate self-regulation. Exploiting a unique national referendum on this issue in Switzerland, we investigate how these interact from a public opinion standpoint. Based on a nationally representative survey experiment (N=1564), we find that while baseline support for state intervention is high (approx. 60%), corporate self-regulation decreases such support. However, only credible voluntary business initiatives lead to substantial reductions. Our results speak to a broad policy debate in European countries and the EU on how to ensure compliance of firms with human rights and environmental standards.

Voter turnout in second-order elections is on a dramatic decline in many modern democracies. This article investigates how electoral participation can be substantially increased by holding multiple of these less important elections simultaneously. Leading to a relative decrease in voting costs, concurrent elections theoretically have economies of scale to the individual voter and thus should see turnout levels larger than those obtained in any stand-alone election. Leveraging as-if-random variation of local election timing in Germany, we estimate the causal effect of concurrent mayoral elections on European election turnout at around 10 percentage points. Exploiting variation in treatment intensity, we show that the magnitude of the concurrency effect is contingent upon district size and the competitiveness of the local race.

About one-third of all food produced for human consumption worldwide is wasted, particularly in highincome countries. Reducing this waste is key to decreasing negative environmental impacts from the food sector and increasing food security in developing countries. Yet, achieving food waste reduction is challenging. It is widely presumed that efforts at stricter food waste regulation may increase food prices, and hence consumer and citizen opposition could render such ambitious regulation politically unfeasible.Here, we argue that appropriate policy framing, design, and feedbacks can ensure public support despite food price increases. Our empirical analysis uses survey experiments with a population-representative sample (N=3'329) from a typical high-income country, Switzerland. First, in a combined framing and conjoint experiment, we show that messages emphasizing national or international social norms in favor of reducing food waste (policy framing) can increase public support for more ambitious reduction targets.We also show that a majority of citizens support food waste regulation, even if this leads to substantial increases in food prices, but only if such policies set stringent reduction targets and are transparently monitored (policy design). Finally, in a vignette experiment, we show that voluntary industry initiatives do not crowd out individuals' support for stricter governmental regulation, but potentially crowd-in support if industry initiatives are unambitious (policy feedback). Our research offers an analytical template for studying public support for food waste regulation and shows that there is more political room for adopting ambitious policies than hitherto presumed.

How do natural disasters affect electoral participation? The existing social science literature offers contradicting predictions. On the one hand a considerable literature in sociology and psychology suggest that traumatic events can inspire pro-social behavior, which might increase turnout. On the other hand, political science has long held that economic resources are crucial ingredients for civic engagement. Consequentially, natural disasters should reduce electoral participation. We show how these distinct views can be jointly analysed within the Riker and Ordeshook model of voting. This paper then reports results on the impact of the 2002 and 2013 floods in Germany on turnout in federal and state elections in Saxonia and Bavaria, conducted few weeks after the floods. Analyzing community level turnout data, and drawing on a differencein-differences framework, we find that flood exposure has a consistent negative effect on turnout, even in the wake of a quick and effective government response. This indicates that the increase in the costs of voting outweighed any increase in political engagement in our case. This stands in contrast to results from developing contexts, where flood management was convincingly linked to electoral participation, suggesting that the impact of natural disasters might differ substantially between developed and developing countries. We additionally find no support for mechanisms proposed in other contexts, e.g. the salience of the race or partisanship, pointing to the need for additional research.

Almost all regulatory policy stops at the national border. Thus, when conducting business abroad, the behaviour of firms is regulated by their host, not home country. Yet, international institutions have issued (non-binding) codes of conduct on social/environmental aspects of firm behaviour, and various high-income countries discuss how to improve extraterritorial firm behaviour – with high political contestation over the appropriate mix of state intervention and corporate self-regulation. Exploiting a unique national referendum on this issue in Switzerland, we investigate how these interact from a public opinion standpoint. Based on a nationally representative survey experiment (N=1564) we find that while baseline support for state intervention is high (approx. 60%), corporate self-regulation decreases such support. However, only credible voluntary business initiatives lead to substantial reductions. Our results speak to a broad policy debate in European countries and the EU on how to ensure compliance of firms with human rights and environmental standards.

Environmental policy is touching on ever more aspects of corporate and individual behavior, and there is much debate over what combinations of top-down (government-imposed) and bottom-up (voluntary private sector) measures to use. In post-industrial, democratic societies, citizens’ preferences over such combinations are crucial, because they shape the political feasibility space in which policymakers can act. We argue that policy-designs relying on voluntary measures receive more public support if they are based on inclusive decision-making, use strong transparency and monitoring mechanisms, and include a trigger for government intervention in case of ineffectiveness. Survey experiments focusing on two green economy issues in Switzerland (N=1941) provide strong support for these arguments. The findings are surprisingly consistent across the two contexts. This suggests that our study design offers a useful template for research that explores politically feasible green economy policy designs for other issues and in other countries.