Holding Individual Representatives Accountable: The Role of Electoral Systems

Rudolph, Lukas; Däubler, Thomas

doi:10.1086/685378

Cited by 44 publications

(33 citation statements)

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“…Even if the reservation value of most voters was small in most cases, shocks that affect voter preferences (and hence their reservation value) can more readily translate into representation that is in line with voter preferences under a PLPR system in which voters follow a satisficing with rank-taking logic (compared to closed lists). While the analyses in this paper cannot say to which extent voters rate candidates on different grounds than parties, findings from other studies show that voters do use PLPR systems to punish candidates they associate with misconduct (Rudolph and Däubler 2016) or a low-regarded ruling elite (Stegmaier et al 2014). Perhaps preference voting in list systems rather has the character of a veto or correction device, with strong manifestations only visible in rather exceptional 36 Also note that parties may do this only because lists are not closed, and having the original order overturned may imply reputation costs.…”

Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 59%

“…This latter finding adds to the evidence for the satisficing-with-rank-taking model, as further discussed in the main text. Table A.5: Effects of moving up one rank by rank and by omitted first versus any subsequent baseline list position (as reported in Figure 1) ( (Rudolph and Däubler 2016;Kauder and Potrafke 2015), and urbanity. Results show no evidence that the distribution function of the list ranks of candidates in a district differs by these observable characteristics.…”

Section: A4 Additional Specifications For Main Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Table A.6 reports that the 19Even if there is correlation in candidate performance across tiers, there is no obvious bias, since the counterfactual focuses on another candidate: if we expect that some SMD-candidate A would do better in the OLPR tier of her SMD, this leads to a comparison of some other candidate B's performance in SMDs in which A competes (and has not got the advantage) with B's performance in the SMD of A (in which A would do better but does not appear on the list).Binary variables: district with 2013 CSU relatives affair(Rudolph and Däubler 2016;Kauder and Potrafke 2015), urban district (SMD district predominantly is a city or town); continuous variables, binarized at the 50th percentile: CSU first vote, employment share, immigrant share, population density, population influx, number of constructions, number of farmers, taxes per capita. distribution of pre-election list ranks does not differ by these observables, which supports our argument that districts in which candidates from lower list ranks are removed are comparable to those in which candidates from higher ones are removed.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cue-Taking, Satisficing, or Both? Quasi-experimental Evidence for Ballot Position Effects

Däubler

Rudolph

2018

Polit Behav

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Ballot position effects have been documented across a variety of political and electoral systems. In general, knowledge of the underlying mechanisms is limited. There is also little research on such effects in preferential-list PR systems, in which parties typically present ranked lists and thus signaling is important. This study addresses both gaps. Theoretically, we formalize four models of voter decision-making: pure appeal-based utility maximization, implying no position effects; rank-taking, where voters take cues from ballot position per se; satisficing, where choice is a function of appeal, but voters consider the options in the order of their appearance; and a hybrid "satisficing-with-rank-taking" variant. From these, we derive differential observable implications. Empirically, we exploit a quasi-experiment, created by the mixed-member electoral system that is used in the state of Bavaria, Germany. Particular electoral rules induce variation in both the observed rank and the set of competitors, and allow for estimating effects at all ranks. We find clear evidence for substantial position effects, which are strongest near the top, but discernible even for the 15th list position. In addition, a candidate's vote increases when the average appeal of higher-placed (but not that of lower-placed) competitors is lower. Overall, the evidence is most compatible with the hybrid satisficing-with rank-taking model. Ballot position thus affects both judgment and choice of candidates.

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Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 59%

Section: A4 Additional Specifications For Main Modelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Cue-Taking, Satisficing, or Both? Quasi-experimental Evidence for Ballot Position Effects

Däubler

Rudolph

2018

Polit Behav

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“…Our study is different in that it looks at whether scandals affect how voters react to politicians who belong to the same social group as the scandalous politicians. Our findings add to recent results suggesting that scandals exert only modest effects on voting in subsequent elections (e.g., Basinger, ; Eggers, ; Rudolph & Däubler, ; Vivyan, Wagner, & Tarlov, ).…”

supporting

confidence: 86%

Does Exposure to Stereotype‐Disconfirming Politicians Reduce the Effect of Stereotypes on Voting? Evidence From Seven Plagiarism Scandals in Germany

Herrmann

Tepe

2017

Political Psychology

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We examine whether exposure to several salient counterexamples reduces the effect of stereotypes on voting. By taking advantage of a series of seven plagiarism scandals in Germany-a country with high regard for academic credentials where academic titles (Dr. and Prof.) get printed on ballot papers-we test whether the tendency to vote for candidates with a doctor's title decreased in the wake of the scandals. Using crosssectional and longitudinal estimators and controlling for a large range of potential confounders, we find that the electoral advantage of candidates with a doctor's title shrinks from a good half of a percentage point before the scandals down to a third after the scandals. In line with a subtyping hypothesis, the reduction is stronger for candidates from traditional middle-class parties (i.e., the parties of the politicians who were implicated in the scandals). Neither of these effects turns out to be strong enough to reach statistical significance, however. We conclude that seven negative examples in one legislative term had no noticeable effect on the tendency to select candidates based on academic titles. Our study provides a rare opportunity to test the effect of stereotype-disconfirming information on electoral behavior. Our results contribute to a literature demonstrating the resilience of stereotypes to disconfirming information. They also suggest that plagiarism affairs are unlikely to reduce electoral incentives for politicians to obtain a fake doctorate.

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“…Die Grenzen der Wahlrechtsreform in parlamentarischen Regierungssystemen bilden schon seit längerem die Basis für die Rechtfertigung präsidentieller Regierungssysteme (vgl. Shugart und Carey 1992;Mainwaring und Shugart 1997;Cheibub 2006 Präsidentielle Regierungssysteme bringen aber den Nachteil mit sich, exekutive Macht stark in einer einzelnen Person zu konzentrieren (Linz 1994; (Rudolph und Däubler 2016).…”

Section: Semi-parlamentarische Reformoptionenunclassified

Faire Repräsentation versus klare Richtungsentscheide?

Ganghof

Eppner

2019

Z Vgl Polit Wiss

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Zusammenfassung Die Fragmentierung europäischer Parteiensysteme und damit verbundene Schwierigkeiten bei der Koalitionsbildung haben zu einer Neuauflage altbekannter Debatten über unterschiedliche Wahlsysteme geführt. Einige Autoren sehen dabei bestimmte Wahlsysteme als optimalen Kompromiss zwischen den Prinzipien der Mehrheits-und der Verhältniswahl an. Wir argumentieren, dass diese Optimalitätsargumente eine konzeptionelle Schlagseite zugunsten "majoritärer" Demokratiekonzeptionen haben. Eine anspruchsvolle "proportionale" Demokratiekonzeption umfasst die Ziele mechanischer Proportionalität, multidimensionaler Repräsentation und wechselnder Gesetzgebungsmehrheiten. Diese Ziele lassen sich allerdings im parlamentarischen Regierungssystem nicht mit den Zielen der Mehrheitswahl vereinbaren. Der Grund ist, dass die relevanten Hürden des Wahlsystems gleichzeitig für die parlamentarische Repräsentation und die Teilnahme am Misstrauensvotum gelten. Erstere ist entscheidend für die proportionale, letztere für die majoritäre Konzeption der Demokratie. Sind wir bereit diese beiden Hürden zu entkoppeln -und somit das Regierungssystem zu verändern -ergibt sich eine Vielfalt neuer Reformoptionen. Wir illustrieren diese Punkte mit Daten für 29 demokratische Systeme im Zeitraum von 1995 bis 2015. Schlüsselwörter Regierungssysteme · Demokratietypen · WahlsystemeAbstract The increased fragmentation of European party systems and the resulting difficulties of government formation have led to renewed debates about electoral systems. Some authors characterize certain electoral systems as optimal compromises between "proportional" and "majoritarian" conceptions of democracy. We argue that these optimality arguments are biased towards the majoritarian conception. Ambitious proportional conceptions embrace the goals of mechanical proportionality, multidimensional representation and flexible, issue-specific legislative coalitions. However, in parliamentary systems of government these goals cannot be reconciled with majoritarian goals. This is because in parliamentarism the same electoral threshold applies to parliamentary representation and to participation in the vote of nonconfidence procedure. The first threshold is crucial for the proportional, the latter for the majoritarian conception of democracy. If we are willing to decouple the two thresholds -and hence change the form of government -new avenues for reform open up. We illustrate our arguments using data for 29 democratic systems between 1995 and 2015. Keywords Forms of government · Types of democracy · Electoral systems1 Einleitung Die europäischen Parteiensysteme werden fragmentierter. In den Niederlanden etwa gibt es heute 13 Parlamentsparteien, von denen die größte gerade einmal 22 % der Sitze gewonnen hat. Auch in Deutschland hat die Fragmentierung zugenommen, wodurch die Bildung von Regierungen schwieriger wird (Bräuninger et al. 2018). Zudem führen neue Konfliktlinien häufig dazu, dass sich in Wahlkämpfen nicht mehr zwei klar erkennbare Lager gegenüberstehen -so wie in ...

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Holding Individual Representatives Accountable: The Role of Electoral Systems

Cited by 44 publications

References 42 publications

Cue-Taking, Satisficing, or Both? Quasi-experimental Evidence for Ballot Position Effects

Cue-Taking, Satisficing, or Both? Quasi-experimental Evidence for Ballot Position Effects

Does Exposure to Stereotype‐Disconfirming Politicians Reduce the Effect of Stereotypes on Voting? Evidence From Seven Plagiarism Scandals in Germany

Faire Repräsentation versus klare Richtungsentscheide?

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