Neste texto medimos as mudanças das pontuações em matemática e leitura dos alunos brasileiros favorecidos e desfavorecidos no Programa Internacional de Avaliação de Alunos - Pisa - entre 2000 e 2012 e no Sistema de Avaliação da Educação Básica - Saeb - no período de 1995 a 2013, a fim de extrair algumas conclusões provisórias em relação à variação da efetividade do ensino básico brasileiro (1ª a 8ª/9ª séries). Nossos achados mostram que os ganhos no teste de matemática do Pisa são muito maiores do que no teste de leitura. Os ganhos (ou sua ausência) entre 1999 e 2013 no teste do Saeb são também maiores em matemática que em português. Parte do ganho no teste de matemática do Pisa e a maior parte do ganho no teste de leitura resultam do aumento gradual no tempo que os alunos com a idade de quinze anos passam na escola. Os ganhos no Pisa para os estudantes brasileiros mais favorecidos são menores do que entre aqueles com níveis baixos de recursos acadêmicos familiares, o que também se verifica no teste do Saeb.

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Inequality in access to high-quality teachers is an important driver of student socioeconomic achievement gaps. We experimentally evaluate a novel nation-wide low-cost government program aimed at reducing teacher sorting. Specifically, we tested two behavioral strategies designed to motivate teachers to apply to job vacancies in disadvantaged schools. These strategies consisted of an "Altruistic Identity" treatment arm, which primed teachers' altruistic identity by making it more salient, and an "Extrinsic Incentives" arm, which simplified the information and increased the salience of an existing government monetaryincentive scheme rewarding teachers who work in underprivileged institutions. We show that both strategies are successful in triggering teacher candidates to apply to such vacancies, as well as make them more likely to be assigned to a final in-person evaluation in a disadvantaged school. The effect among high-performing teachers is larger, especially in the "Altruistic" arm. Our results imply that low-cost behavioral strategies can enhance the supply and quality of professionals willing to teach in high-need areas.

In this paper, we show that order effects operate in the context of high-stakes, real-world decisions: employment choices. We experimentally evaluate a nationwide program in Ecuador that changed the order of teaching vacancies on a job application platform in order to reduce teacher sorting (that is, lower-income students are more likely to attend schools with less qualified teachers). In the treatment arm, the platform showed hard-to-staff schools (institutions typically located in more vulnerable areas that normally have greater difficulty attracting teachers) first, while in the control group teaching vacancies were displayed in alphabetical order. In both arms, hard-to-staff schools were labeled with an icon and identical information was given to teachers. We find that a teacher in the treatment arm was more likely to apply to hard-to-staff schools, to rank them as their highest priority, and to be assigned to a job vacancy in one of these schools. The effects were not driven by inattentive, altruistic, or less-qualified teachers. The program has thus helped to reduce the unequal distribution of qualified teachers across schools of different socioeconomic backgrounds.