SUMMARY
A primary goal of both financial reporting research and audit research is to understand the determinants of quality, and researchers in both areas have identified a wide set of variables that enhance or impair quality. In this paper, we define financial reporting quality and audit quality and use a person/task/environment framework to summarize prior findings on the determinants of each. We use this framework to discuss the links between the financial reporting and audit academic literatures and highlight the recursive relation between financial reporting quality and audit quality. Our discussion provides insights and suggestions on how financial reporting and audit researchers can learn from each other to improve our collective understanding of financial reporting and audit quality. Using this framework, we also identify opportunities for future research.
To contribute to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) project on auditor communications with audit committees and boards of directors, we present in this paper a review of relevant academic literature. We also identify promising future research opportunities for the academic community. We specifically focus on how the communication process may affect overall financial reporting quality, internal controls, control environments, and external auditors' performance, as well as matters that potentially impact financial reporting and should interest the PCAOB (e.g., in the area of management discussion and analysis). We specifically link the findings from academic research to the discussion questions posed by the PCAOB in its 2004 briefing paper. Several potential implications of the findings should also interest standard-setters and regulators addressing issues related to corporate governance and financial reporting quality.
SUMMARY
Despite the importance of audit committee independence in ensuring the integrity of the financial reporting process, recent research suggests that even when audit committees meet regulatory independence requirements, certain factors, such as undue influence by the CEO over the selection of the audit committee, may diminish the ability of its members to be substantively independent. This study investigates whether auditors consider CEO influence over audit committee independence when making audit judgments where management's incentives to manage earnings differ. In an experiment, we find that audit partners and managers waive a larger amount of a proposed audit adjustment when management's incentives for earnings management are low than when incentives are high. However, when management incentives are high, auditors are less likely to waive as much of an adjustment when the CEO has less influence over the audit committee's independence than when the CEO's influence is greater. In all, the results support our expectations that auditors consider CEO influence on audit committee independence in the resolution of contentious accounting issues.
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