This paper synthesizes the existing literature on disclosure credibility and identifies four factors that investors consider when assessing the credibility of a management disclosure: (1) situational incentives at the time of the disclosure, (2) management's credibility (i.e., competence and trustworthiness), (3) the levels of external and internal assurance, and (4) characteristics of the disclosure itself. Disclosure credibility tends to be higher when management has few incentives to mislead investors and/or is perceived to be competent and trustworthy. Validation by external or internal sources also can enhance a disclosure's credibility. Moreover, disclosure credibility is influenced by various characteristics of the disclosure itself, such as its precision, venue, timing, inherent plausibility, and amount of supporting information.

SUMMARY A primary goal of both financial reporting research and audit research is to understand the determinants of quality, and researchers in both areas have identified a wide set of variables that enhance or impair quality. In this paper, we define financial reporting quality and audit quality and use a person/task/environment framework to summarize prior findings on the determinants of each. We use this framework to discuss the links between the financial reporting and audit academic literatures and highlight the recursive relation between financial reporting quality and audit quality. Our discussion provides insights and suggestions on how financial reporting and audit researchers can learn from each other to improve our collective understanding of financial reporting and audit quality. Using this framework, we also identify opportunities for future research.

This study provides a theoretical framework and experimental evidence on how managers' disclosure decisions affect their credibility with investors. I find that in the short-term, more forthcoming disclosure has a positive effect on management's reporting credibility, especially when management is forthcoming about negative news. However, these short-term credibility effects do not persist over time. In the long-term, managers who report positive earnings news are rated as having higher reporting credibility than managers who report negative earnings news, regardless of their previous disclosure decisions.

This paper proposes and tests a risk model that explains how investors perceive financial risks. The model combines conventional decision-theory variables—probabilities and outcomes—with behavioral variables from psychology research by Slovic (1987), such as the extent to which a risky item is new, causes worry, and is controllable. To test our model, we conduct two studies in which M.B.A. students judge the risk of a broad range of financial items. Our results indicate that both the decisiontheory variables and Slovic's (1987) behavioral variables are important in explaining investors' risk judgments. Further, we demonstrate that information about the amount of potential loss outcome contained within mandated risk disclosures not only directly influences risk judgments, but also indirectly affects such judgments via its effect on some of Slovic's (1987) behavioral variables. By identifying this unintended consequence of current risk disclosures, these results have the potential to influence the way accounting regulators, firm managers, and academic researchers think about risk disclosure.

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Mutual fund companies selectively advertise their better-performing funds. However, investors respond to advertised performance data as if those data were unselected (i.e., representative of the population). We identify the failure to discount selected or potentially selected data as selection neglect. We examine these phenomena in an archival study (Study 1) and two controlled experiments (Studies 2 and 3). Study 1 identifies selection bias in mutual fund advertising by showing that the median performance rank for advertised funds is between the 79th and 100th percentile. Study 2 finds that both novice investors and financial professionals fall victim to selection neglect in a financial advertising task unless the advertisement makes the selective nature of available performance data transparent. Study 3 shows that selection neglect associated with a large well-known company can be debiased with a simple extrinsic sample space cue, although individual differences in statistical reasoning also matter. We argue that selection neglect results from a general tendency to ignore underlying sample spaces rather than a fundamental misunderstanding about the data selection process or the value of selected data.selection bias, financial decision making, mutual fund ads, statistical heuristics, sample space

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