There has been growing recognition in recent years of the importance of corporate governance in ensuring sound financial reporting and deterring fraud. The audit serves as a monitoring device and is thus part of the corporate governance mosaic. The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of various corporate governance factors, such as the board of directors and the audit committee, on the audit process. Importantly, there is little professional guidance on how auditors should consider such factors when formulating an appropriate audit strategy, and there has been only one prior study on this issue (Cohen and Hanno 2000). Because there are no current specific auditing standards that relate to the effect of corporate governance on the audit process, we conducted a semi‐structured interview with 36 auditors on current audit practices in considering corporate governance in the audit process. Reflecting on client experiences, auditors indicate a range of views with regard to the elements included in the rubric of “corporate governance”. Most significantly, auditors view management as the primary driver of corporate governance. The inclusion of top management in the “corporate governance mosaic” is inconsistent with agency theory's prescription of the board and other mechanisms serving as a means to independently oversee management's actions to protect stakeholders. Auditors consider corporate governance factors to be especially important in the client acceptance phase and in an international context. Further, despite the attention placed on the audit committee in the academic literature, in the business community, and by regulators in different countries (e.g., Canada, United States, Australia), several respondents indicated that their experiences with their clients suggest that audit committees are typically ineffective and lack sufficient power to be a strong governance mechanism. Implications for research and practice are presented.

Calls from practice suggest that audit committee members with industry expertise can improve audit committee effectiveness. Nevertheless, regulators and the extant literature have focused on the financial expertise of the audit committee. We posit that audit committee industry knowledge is valuable because accounting guidance, estimates, and oversight of the external auditor are often linked to a company's operations within a particular industry. Taking a holistic view, we examine two measures of financial reporting quality (financial restatements and discretionary accruals) and two measures of external auditor oversight (audit and nonaudit fees). As predicted, we find that audit committee members who are both accounting and industry experts perform better than those with only accounting expertise. We also find that in certain instances, supervisory experts who are also industry experts perform better than supervisory experts alone. Overall, these results suggest that industry expertise, when combined with accounting expertise, can improve the effectiveness of the audit committee in monitoring the financial reporting process. Data Availability: All data are gathered from publicly available sources.

SUMMARY Both researchers (e.g., Nelson 2009) and regulators (e.g., the PCAOB) have emphasized the importance of exercising the appropriate level of professional skepticism when conducting an audit. However, professional skepticism remains a hard concept to define and measure. In addition, it is often difficult to determine if a lack of skepticism is the primary cause of audit deficiencies and if so, what factors led to the lack of skepticism. The purpose of this paper is threefold: (1) extend the work of Nelson (2009) by synthesizing research related to auditors' professional skepticism to identify antecedents to both skeptical judgment and skeptical action, (2) identify areas where research is lacking on a particular dimension and suggest avenues for future research, and (3) discuss the implications of research findings for regulators and auditing professionals. We adopt two foundational aspects of the framework introduced in the seminal paper by Nelson (2009), which proposes that lack of skepticism can either be the result of a failure in problem recognition (lack of skeptical judgment) or a failure to act on a problem recognized (lack of skeptical action). We organize research studies into four categories of antecedents: studies relating to auditor characteristics, evidence characteristics, client characteristics, and environmental characteristics. We find that while research studies provide insights into both the antecedents to skeptical judgments and actions, the majority of research efforts to date have focused on the antecedents to skeptical judgments and on auditor characteristics in particular. Research findings have implications for practice, but in order to understand how skeptical judgment translates into skeptical action, additional research on skeptical action will need to be conducted.

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