Evidence of falling wages in Catholic cities and rising wages in Protestant cities between 1500 and 1750, during the spread of literacy in the vernacular, is inconsistent with most theoretical models of economic growth. In The Protestant Ethic, Weber suggested an alternative explanation based on culture. Here, a theoretical model confirms that a small change in the subjective cost of cooperating with strangers can generate a profound transformation in trading networks. In explaining urban growth in early-modern Europe, specifications compatible with human-capital versions of the neoclassical model and endogenous-growth theory are rejected in favor of a “small-world” formulation based on the Weber thesis. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001Key words: Growth – Religion – Networks – Culture – Europe, JEL classification: O52,

Earlier studies have explained inter-country variations in the share of GNP devoted to military expenditures by international spillovers and by differences in the threat of attack related to relative incomes. In this paper, we use the theory of public choice to explain these differences. We attempt to measure the importance of both international spillovers and relative incomes, along with two other factors: the tax-price elasticity of demand and economies of scale in the consumption of security.We find that international spillovers are significant and positive, that the income elasticity of demand is greater than unity, that the tax-price elasticity of demand explains part of observed inter-country differences, and that there are considerable economies of scale in the consumption of military spending. Finally, between 1960 and 1975, there was apparently a substantial increase in the value which each country derived from a dollar of military spending by its allies. This phenomenon, which seems related to the increased importance of deterrent weapons, has tended to induce individual alliance members to reduce the share of their national income devoted to defense.

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Existing theories explain the rise and fall of states either by random factors specific to each state or by a life cycle to which any state eventually succumbs. However, neither approach is able to explain systematic patterns such as the tendency toward smaller political units during the millennium from 400 to 1400 A.D. and the movement in the opposite direction over the last six centuries. Here it is argued that such changes are due to innovations in the technology of information processing and military control that alter the cost of generating rewards and imposing punishment.

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