Religion and economic growth: was Weber right?

Abstract

Evidence of falling wages in Catholic cities and rising wages in Protestant cities between 1500 and 1750, during the spread of literacy in the vernacular, is inconsistent with most theoretical models of economic growth. In The Protestant Ethic, Weber suggested an alternative explanation based on culture. Here, a theoretical model confirms that a small change in the subjective cost of cooperating with strangers can generate a profound transformation in trading networks. In explaining urban growth in early-modern Europe, specifications compatible with human-capital versions of the neoclassical model and endogenous-growth theory are rejected in favor of a “small-world” formulation based on the Weber thesis. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001Key words: Growth – Religion – Networks – Culture – Europe, JEL classification: O52,

Which Ethics Will Make us Individually and Socially Happier? A Cross-Culture and Cross-Development Analytical Model

“…This suggested distinguishing nonProtestant Christians from Protestant Christians: non-Protestant Christians show a lesser attitude toward cooperation, a larger willingness to break legal rules (such as to cheat on taxes, to accept bribes or to avoid a fare on public transport), and a lower level of trust in others (Guiso et al, 2003); they do not share the universalizability criterion that came out of Western rationalist philosophy (Jensen, 2006); and they show a lesser attitude to Corporate Social Responsibility in terms of equality (such as treating all employees and job applicants equally, regardless of gender, race, religion or sexuality) and rights (such as reducing human rights abuses in the world) (Brammer et al, 2007). This could be explained by remembering that Protestants rejected the Catholic sacrament of penance, and a person can obtain pardon for sins committed, provided that he performs certain acts of reparation, while for Catholics, the cost of defection in any contractual relationship remains low since such pardon can always be obtained with the intervention of a priest (Blum and Dudley, 2001): however, the equilibrium arising in Protestant societies, where individual compliance to rules is formal and social sanctions towards incompliance are crucial, could be unstable (think of immigration) if deviant behaviours expand to a significant proportion of the population and/or if social reprobation is adopted by an insignificant proportion of the population (McClearly, 2007). Similarly, the Golden rule is here considered as a universal moral principle implying (not a fully developed system of ethics) an impartial perspective, without abandoning sympathy for the other, to commit to social equity, and to treat other moral persons as ends, not merely as means to an end, in other words it is here used as a short form of the categorical imperative, although it is imperfectly derived from it.…”

“…• aspiration levels move deterministically up step by step (for example, f(t+1) = f(t) + γ with γ > 0) or change stochastically due to live events (for example, f(t+1) = f(t) + γ with γ a stochastic variable) (Martin, 2008) • actions of each individual are linked to actions taken by other people (think of the Copper rule): objCopper = f 1 *(a 11 +(1-a 11^a )-ε)*probII+ ζ 1 *f 1 *(η 11 a 11 +η 21 (1-a 11^a )-ε)*(1-prII)+f 2 *(a 12 +(1-a 12^b )-ε)*probII+ζ 2 *f 2 *(η 12 a 12 +η 22 (1-a 12^b )-ε)*(1-probII) with ζ j < 1 depicting the missed happiness due to the non-Pareto optimal outcomes (Non cooperate, Non-cooperate in the Prisoner Dilemma), while η ij < 1 depicting the small efforts in actions a ij ; in other words, happiness from a specific ethical approach could depend on the number of people choosing, or the probability of meeting people choosing the same approach (probII), which in turn can be assessed once a statistical distribution of goals over the population is assumed: this extension leads us to predict a reduction of happiness from ethics 1 and 2 (see also Blum and Dudley, 2001 (1-a 11^a )-ε)*probII+ζ 1 *f 1 *(a 11 +(1-a 11^a )-ε)*(1-prII)+ f 2 *(a 12 +(1-a 12^b )-ε)*probII+ζ 2 *f 2 *(a 12 +(1-a 12^b )-ε)*(1-probII) with ζ j < 1 depicting the missed happiness due to the non-Pareto optimal outcomes (Cooperate, Non-cooperate in the Prisoner Dilemma): this extension leads us to predict a reduction of happiness from ethics II (see again Blum and Dudley, 2001). Reasoning on the Golden and Copper rule extensions leads us to predict the following individual dynamics: a reduction of reciprocity (smaller probII) at time t is likely to reduce people willing to apply the Golden rule and to increase people willing to apply the Copper rule at time t+1: in other words, happiness from ethics II, 1 and 2 becomes smaller with respect to the I ethical approach.…”

The Role of Religion and Political Regime for Human Capital and Economic Development

“…Literature offers two reasons for this development. (Blum, 2001) or (Botticini, 2005) emphasized the role of education. According to them, the translation of Bible into the national languages and understanding Tora led to higher education with the positive impact on democratization and economic development.…”

Economic behavior of indigenous peoples: the Mexican case

“…Now, it is necessary to analyze and dissect the culture of the population under study to find specific patterns that affect economic behavior. For example, the influence of the ''beliefs'' factor on the labor supply is too general and difficult to research, as there are many beliefs; however, it is possible to analyze the effects of specific beliefs-such as the belief that there is divine forgiveness in life-on compliance with business agreements and contracts, as Blum and Dudley (2001) have done. In the case of our paper, the cultural factor is that indigenous people prefer to work on a small scale, or indigenous people prefer workshop discipline to factory discipline.…”