Structural change in interdependent bureaucracies: Was Rome's failure economic or military?

Dudley, Léonard

doi:10.1016/0014-4983(90)90011-m

Cited by 11 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…According to Proposition 2, if military scale economies decline, the size of the typical state will fall and its degree of centralization rise. Trends in these two directions were apparent throughout the first millennium A.D., the period of diffusion of heavy-cavalry techniques (see Dudley, 1990). During the middle decades of the third century A.D., centralized power collapsed in the Roman empire (as it did in China).…”

Section: The Size and Degree Of Centralization Of Statesmentioning

confidence: 93%

Punishment, reward and the fortunes of states

Dudley

1992

Public Choice

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Existing theories explain the rise and fall of states either by random factors specific to each state or by a life cycle to which any state eventually succumbs. However, neither approach is able to explain systematic patterns such as the tendency toward smaller political units during the millennium from 400 to 1400 A.D. and the movement in the opposite direction over the last six centuries. Here it is argued that such changes are due to innovations in the technology of information processing and military control that alter the cost of generating rewards and imposing punishment.

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Section: The Size and Degree Of Centralization Of Statesmentioning

confidence: 93%

Punishment, reward and the fortunes of states

Dudley

1992

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“…The more recent attempt I know of is the collective book edited by Bernholz and Vaubel (2004). 12 See Dudley (1990Dudley ( , 1991Dudley ( , 1997. This author highlights also the effect on taxes, though not on political representation.…”

Section: Changes In the Equilibrium Of The Autocrat And The Institutimentioning

confidence: 94%

“…Just the same, progress in defensive techniques favoured the few against the many as well as the cities against the kings, and the contrary occurred with progress in offensive ones. To take another instance, also invoked by Dudley (1990), the Romans' proficiency in siege warfare, their use of missile weapons (the pila of legionaries) and the flexibility of the Roman infantry formations put in their hands the means to conquer their Empire at a low cost. 16 In turn, the invention of the stirrup and saddle, together with breeding of new races of stronger horses able to carry an armoured cavalryman and a harness for themselves, enhanced the effectiveness of mounted troops, letting the Roman infantry obsolete in the face of these quickly-moving enemies and re-establishing constant returns to scale for centuries.…”

Section: Changes In the Equilibrium Of The Autocrat And The Institutimentioning

confidence: 99%

The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach

Coll

2008

Const Polit Econ

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“…Bernholz and Vaubel (2004) are also unable to account for the failure of Southeast Asia to be at the forefront of human civilizations despite several potentially-advantageous factors: the continuous functioning of a Southeast Asian state system since the late classical era, the auspicious position of Southeast Asia as a crossroads of major civilizations, and the abundance of resources in Southeast 16 Kennedy (1987) has the same finding. The economies of scale in conflict (or the returns to scale in conflict, or military decisiveness, or the mass factor-terms which are used interchangeably in this book), are well-studied by scholars such as Dudley (1990Dudley ( , 1991Dudley ( , 1992 and Hirshleifer (1995). 19 It also occupies a prominent position in many grand strategy theories such as that of Wittman (1991).…”

Section: Jimmy Tengmentioning

confidence: 99%

Musket, Map and Money: How Military Technology Shaped Geopolitics and Economics

Teng¹

2014

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While stressing the role of institutions and property rights regimes in affecting economic performance, North (1981) posits that the competition between European states was a source of institutional change that led ultimately to the European Miracle. Intense and prolonged interstate rivalry led to changes in political and economic institutions as states became more inclusive in order to get support from wider social groups to sustain their effort for greater power at the international arena and that led to better economic performance. 7 North (1995, 1998) reiterates his position in North (1981) to explain economic development by international political military competition. North (1995) notes that: "……Even the relative failures in Western Europe played an essential role in European development and were more successful than China or Islam because of competitive pressures." (26) The "relative failures" here refers to countries such as Portugal or Spain that were once forerunners in European economic development but somehow were overtaken later by countries such as Netherlands and England. Jones (1988) further develops the basic theme of Jones (1981) in the case studies of Song China and Tokugawa Japan, and Jones (1990) provides a more detailed study of the Song China's high economic achievements. Jones (1988) calls for case studies of other major instances of very long-term economic changes in a world historical framework. Jones (2002) repeats this exhortation. 8 The call did not go unanswered. Bernholz et al. (1998) and Bernholz and Vaubel (2004) answer the call by formulating the Hume-Kant hypothesis and testing it against practically the whole of world history. Bernholz et al. (1998) and Bernholz and Vaubel (2004) termed the theory that explains economic development by the nature of the international political system the Hume-Kant Hypothesis and presented case studies that cover almost the whole written history of mankind. According to Bernholz and Vaubel, they themselves weren't the originators of the Hume-Kant hypothesis-they see its assertion, under varying names, in many writers through history. The Hume-Kant hypothesis has echoes in many prominent thinkers and scholars from all academic fields over the cen

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Structural change in interdependent bureaucracies: Was Rome's failure economic or military?

Cited by 11 publications

References 24 publications

Punishment, reward and the fortunes of states

Punishment, reward and the fortunes of states

The origins and evolution of democracy: an exercise in history from a constitutional economics approach

Musket, Map and Money: How Military Technology Shaped Geopolitics and Economics

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