It is widely believed that children will choose furniture that has the same color as their preferred color. Furthermore, for different categories of furniture, the color they preferred for furniture is consistent. A study of 508 adolescent Chinese children between the ages of 12 and 16 has been carried out to explore whether color preference influences their choice of furniture when they are provided with various color options (16 chromatic and five achromatic colors). This work tested six items of furniture in two functional spaces (study and bedroom space). Findings indicate that adolescent children's color preferences did indeed affect their furniture choice, but the extent varies with the categories of furniture. Furthermore, this study reveals that children's preference for furniture in different functional spaces is slightly different. Some effects of gender and age were also explored. This work discusses the implications of adolescent color preference and color choice for children's furniture color design.

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We apply sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance as an effective measurement of corporate governance to examine the bonding mechanism among the cross‐listed Chinese firms between 2005 and 2017. Our sample covers the nonfinancial firms listed on both China and Hong Kong stock exchanges (AH‐share firms) and firms in China only (A‐share firms). We find that AH‐share firms have much higher sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance than A‐share firms. However, the bonding effect only exists when executive cash compensation and firm accounting performance are considered. Executive compensation on stock return, chief executive officer turnover on firm accounting performance, or chief executive officer turnover on stock market performance, all demonstrate no bonding effect. The results are attributed to institutional environment in which executive compensation is solely dependent on accounting profits among Chinese firms, and the A‐share market offers weak investor protection. We also find that both legal and reputational bonding effects work on improved governance of AH‐share firms, although such effects are highly dependent on specific market mechanisms including that of firm executives. Our findings may contribute to current bonding literature and have policy implications on future state‐owned enterprise reforms.